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I.

INTRODUCTION

Americans have created the most expensive litigation system in the
world. We are incapable of trying medium-sized lawsuits at lesser costs
than the amounts in controversy.1 Our system lengthens large lawsuits so
that potential jurors who have businesses or professions cannot serve. 2 It
produces results that depend upon issues unrelated to the merits.3 The
outcomes and even the processes are unpredictable, with adverse effects

I. See generally, e.g., DAVID CRUMP & JEFFREY B. BERMAN, THE STORY OF A CIVIL CASE:
DOMINGUEZ V.SCOTr's FOOD STORE (3d ed. 2001) (tracing the history of a slip-and-fall trial and
appeal in which cumulative attorney's fees far exceeded plaintiff's modest award).
2. Cf DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 556, 559 n.5
(4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter CRUMPET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS] (excerpting and describing voir
dire examination in a multibillion-dollar litigation with a predicted length of many weeks in which
managerial and professional members of venire sought to be excused, and showing the judge's
efforts to keep these people on the jury).
3. See, e.g., Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675, 683-84, 690 (N.D. 1970); see also infra Part
l11.A (discussing the result in Leake, which depended upon application of the hearsay rule, not the
merits).
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upon both adjudication and settlement.4 There are many reasons for
these effects, but the rules of evidence are a major contributor to them.
Therefore, this Article considers the case for selectively abolishing
existing exclusionary principles in the rules of evidence. It is not a call
for total abolition, because these principles are too firmly entrenched for
that, and they have justifications that remain persuasive in some
instances. Furthermore, there are some rules, particularly in the 400
series of the Federal Rules and in principles governing privileges, that
require retention, at least in a modified form. It is healthy, however, to
consider whether some parts of the existing rules may cost more than the
value of any benefits they provide. It should be added that this Article is
not a call for reinstatement of the common law of evidence that
governed before the rules. I believe that some of our exclusionary rules
are dysfunctional, irrespective of whether their development has been
legislative, through the Rules, or judicial, through common law.
This Article begins with preliminary consideration of the reasons
for my proposals, including the dwindling number of jury trials.6 It then
examines the hearsay rule, proceeds next to consider rules governing
repetitive-behavior evidence, and also covers issues regarding opinion
evidence, experts, and authentication.7 These issues involve most of the
common exclusionary principles. The Article then considers the rest of
the 400 series-relevance related rules, particularly those in Rules 401
through 403-and proposes a modified formulation of them.8 Next, the
Article evaluates some overall issues that apply to all of these
exclusionary rules, including their impact upon the jury trial-a
vanishing event today-and including strategic responses by judges and
litigants to their retrenchment. In this regard, this Article considers
separate rules that could be inaugurated if the existing rules were pruned
as suggested, including rules designed to direct lawyers and trials to the
point earlier.9 A final section considers this author's conclusions, which
include the proposition that although the results of this proposal for
selective abolition are unpredictable, the current system is sufficiently
4. For an eye-opening example of the disconnect between outcomes and merits, see
generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (concluding that securities litigations settle for consistent
percentages of projected damages, irrespective of their merits, apparently because parties regard
outcomes at trial as unpredictable and untrustworthy).
5. See infra Parts II.B-C, VII.B (illustrating the complexity and cost effects of the rules).
6. See infra Part il.
7. See infra Parts III-VI.
8.

See infra Part ViI.

9. See infra Part VIII-IX.
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dysfunctional to make it worthwhile to try significant revisions in the
rules.
I am honored to have this Article followed by the thoughts of my
longtime friend, Professor Paul Rice, on many of the same controversial
subjects. In some instances Professor Rice agrees with me, but as is to be
expected, in others he does not. Readers are the beneficiaries of the
difference. Undoubtedly, many readers will find much of what Professor
Rice has to say persuasive, and I hope that this pairing of two partly
contrasting, partly congruent articles will increase interest in both. So,
thank you, Professor Rice!
II.
A.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Why Such an OutlandishProposal?

At the outset, let me say that I do not expect the idea of jettisoning
major parts of the rules to achieve acceptance any time soon, or indeed
ever-I am not delusional, or at least not to that point. This Article
might be considered a thought exercise, although I hope it might do
more: serve the useful function of inducing debate about which parts of
the rules that exclude good evidence really do not serve their purposes
sufficiently to justify their retention. It might even lead to a kind of "zero
based budgeting" by which the retention of rules that exclude significant
amounts of useful evidence might be evaluated not merely by their
having been in place for a long time,10 and not even by the possibility
that they might in some cases be used to avoid decision by erroneous
information,1' but by their achievement of positive purposes that
perceptibly exceed their effect in2 making trials more expensive,
unpredictable, inaccurate and scarce.'
10. For example, long existence explains the hearsay exception for excited utterances,
although sound arguments show it to be unreliable. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
11. For example, rules excluding evidence of repetitive conduct are explained, above all, by
the fear that "a jury might overestimate the probative value of such evidence by assuming that
merely because the defendant has committed crimes before, he is likely to be guilty of the offense
charged." United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 906 n.I 1 (8th Cir. 1975). This reasoning is
singularly unpersuasive, because the "fear" that the jury might "overestimate" probative value
supports the exclusion of almost any kind of evidence. In fact, this "fear" should be lesser for
repetitive but circumstantial evidence than for other kinds of evidence that are more direct, such as
eyewitness identifications or DNA analyses. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
12. The real problem with the exclusion of repetitive-conduct evidence is that justifications
usually do not consider whether it provides useful evidence or whether the jury can reasonably
evaluate it. See, e.g., Calvert, 523 F.2d at 906. The Calvert justifications, for example, do not
address these issues.
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Above all, this Article is a plea for evidence rule writers to focus
upon the phenomenon of the vanishing trial when they tinker with the
rules. I do not have statistical proof of the point, but I am convinced that,
among some evidence scholars, there is a bias in favor of rules that
exclude evidence and against rules that admit it. To elaborate, I believe
that some evidence scholars, as rules drafters, would tend to accept the
following ideas in evaluating new rule proposals' 3:
(1) A rule that narrows the range of admissible evidence is more
frequently a good idea than a rule that expands the available
evidence;
(2) A rule that amends an existing provision about admissibility by
adding requirements to the elements already present, in the
manner of ornaments on a holiday tree, is more often a good idea
than a rule that reduces requirements;
(3) A rule that makes predicate elements more difficult to prove is
more often a good idea than one that makes predicates more
readily demonstrable; and
(4) A rule that conditions evidence admissibility on a notice
requirement is almost always a good idea.
I could go on in developing the specifics of what I see as an
evidence-narrowing tendency among some evidence scholars, but I hope
that the point is sufficiently clear. And I should add that my only
systematic empirical support for inferring this tendency is furnished by
recent rules amendments that scholars have successfully sponsored.
Their thrust has been generally in the direction of narrowing the scope of
admissible evidence.' 4 But also, to an extent, my assertion that these are
13. For examples of recent articles advocating restricted evidence admissibility, see Aviva
Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1540-57 (2005) (advocating significant restrictions on evidence admitted
under Rules 413-414); Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding
Due Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST. 39, 47-54 (2005) (advocating
restrictions of currently admissible hearsay); Michael S. Vitale, Note, Damaged Goods: Why, in
Light of the Supreme Court's Recent Punitive Damages Jurisprudence,Congress Must Amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1419-35 (2005) (advocating restrictions on
evidence of similar, but extraterritorial, events offered to prove punitive damages).
14. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (showing amendments that exclude all expert opinion unless
it meets three new numbered requirements); FED. R. EVID. 703 (showing amendments that prohibit
merits use of facts or data supporting expert opinion and to limit admissibility for other purposes);
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (showing amendments that exclude co-conspirators' statements unless
predicate is proved by extrinsic evidence).
The most significant Rules that have expanded admissibility, Rules 413-15, did not
originate with evidence scholars, but instead came from Congress; in fact, they were opposed,
usually vehemently, by scholars. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. There also have
been amendments to Rules 804(6) and 803(6). FED. R. EVID. 804(6) (forfeiture by wrongdoing);
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the tendencies of many evidence scholars is based upon observations
made during committee meetings and the like. What gets studied most
thoroughly when evidence scholars look at the rules is the immediate
issue in a particular rule, in isolation;15 what gets emphasized are the
concerns raised by the possibility of unreliable inferences; 16 and what
sometimes gets lost is the big picture: the cumulative effect of the rules
in creating "gotcha"-type arguments,' 7 in reducing worthwhile
information, 18 and in making trials more complicated and difficult. 19 In
this Article, I hope to make arguments in the opposite direction.
The ultimate effect of the Article, I would hope, might be that
individual rules would come to be written and interpreted only after
consideration of their effects on the vanishing trial. For example, there
have been arguments to the effect that the residual exception to the
hearsay rule is too easily invoked and that the exception should be
limited to highly unusual cases.2z I doubt the premise of the argument
(my own guess is that the exception is too rarely invoked), 2' but even if
FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (business record affidavits). But they affect few cases compared to the
exclusionary amendments. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Back to the Future with Privileges: Abandon
Codification, Not the Common Law, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 739, 749 (2004).
15. See Donald Nicolson, Truth, Reason and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in Evidence
Discourse,57 MOD. L. REv. 726, 741-42 (1994) (concluding that scholars spend their time studying
admissibility, which is a small part of litigation, and that the Rules can be seen better in context).
16. Evidence law is about the limits we place on the information juries hear. William
Twining, Evidence as a Multi-DisciplinarySubject, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 91, 96 (2003).
17. Notice requirements, for example, have proliferated. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 41215, 609, 807. The policy is obvious and unobjectionable in every instance, but I believe the
cumulative effect of these, and the mass of other notice requirements, is the disproportionate
creation of "gotcha" arguments. In other words, the rules create ambush situations in which: 1) the
proponent is acting in good faith and either does not know of one among the many scattered
requirements, or believes the other party already has notice; or 2) the opponent seeks a windfall, and
is able to escape from the effect of otherwise admissible evidence on the basis of violations that
create little prejudice.
18. See infra Parts III-VI (discussing the impact of rules excluding hearsay, repetitive
conduct, expert opinion, and items not formally authenticated).
19. See infra Parts 1.B-D, VIII.B (discussing the impact of rules on strategy, complexity, and
trial frequency).
20. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catchalls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red
Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 925, 951 (1992);
Myrna S. Raeder, Commentary, A Response to ProfessorSwift: The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It
Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 507, 507, 514 (1992)
(responding to Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by
JudicialDiscretion?,76 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1992)).
21. The argument is often based on comparisons of results of criminal defendants' appeals of
residual exception rulings admitting prosecution evidence and excluding defense evidence. See
authorities cited supra note 20. Although this data is easy to collect, I do not believe that it reflects
the impact of the residual exception. Exclusions of prosecution evidence during trial would almost
never produce appeals, and neither would a defendant's successful invocation of the residual
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the premise were granted, I believe that there would be sound reasons
for broad acceptance of the residual exception. 2 As another example,
initial proposals for the Federal Rules featured a far more flexible
hearsay rule than the relatively rigid one we actually have. It contained a
broad exception admitting hearsay that had measures of trustworthiness
and necessity, for which the exceptions would have served as examples,
rather than as rigid categories.23 The proposal was narrowed to produce
the present rules because of traditional concerns about hearsay risks.24
As will appear further below, I argue that more general admittance of
hearsay would be a good thing, and the initial proposal contained in the
House Bill was consistent with my arguments. Similarly, my arguments
would support both the current rules admitting repetitive conduct in
sexual assault cases and the extension of the same principle to other
cases, the liberalization of expert opinion evidence, 25 and many other
specific changes in the rules or their interpretation.
In summary, I do not hope for wholesale acceptance of my proposal
here. Instead, what I hope for is recognition of the cumulative tendency
of the current rules to contribute to the expense, unpredictability,
inaccuracy, and evanescence of trials, and for application of this
recognition to any debate about individual rules.

exception; thus, the data is, by definition, likely to support the commentator's arguments even if
those arguments are flatly incorrect. Furthermore, appeals of residual exception rulings are
exceedingly rare in comparison to other evidentiary or procedural issues, suggesting that the
argument is overstated. The "fallacy of availability" is a term used to describe inferences based on
easily available data rather than those more determinative of the question. See DAVID CRUMP, How
TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
POLICY § 2.02, at 52-53 (2001) [hereinafter CRUMP, HOW TO REASON].

A better data set might be composed by surveying District Judges or Assistant United
States Attorneys. "In how many cases have you admitted or introduced evidence by using the
'residual exception' to the hearsay rule?" The question probably would prompt many answers of,
"I've never heard of it."
22. Exclusion of evidence conforming to the residual exception is particularly costly because
the rule requires it to be trustworthy and incapable of sound coverage by substitutes. See infra Part
III.A (describing the costs of the hearsay exclusion).
23. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearing on H.R. 5463 Before the Subcomm. on the
Judiciary,93d Cong. 266-67, 270-75 (1974) [hereinafter Hearingon H.R. 5463] (testimony of Paul
F. Rothstein, Professor, Georgetown University). The proposal under consideration would have
abolished categorical exceptions and substituted broad discretionary admissibility of hearsay that
was trustworthy and needed. This proposal would have achieved the substantial equivalent of the
proposals for hearsay revision in this Article. See id. at 266-67, 272.
24. See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 801-807 (reflecting much narrower admissibility, with
categorical exceptions). Professor Rothstein's views were, as always, well reasoned and persuasive,
and I am unusual in believing that they pointed in the wrong direction.
25. See infra Parts IV-VII (continuing arguments for admissibility of these items).
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B. The Problem of PresentingLive Witnesses (And the Insistence of the
Rules upon It)
I come to this problem from a background in trials, both civil and
criminal. Of all the ways in which the world of trial is different from the
ideal of the evidence-course classroom, there are perhaps none
comparable to the issue of presenting live witnesses. In my evidence
courses, a common question is: "Why didn't the plaintiff just present the
live witness?" The question comes from students who, like many of their
professors, have never seen a jury trial, much less had the complex
responsibility of putting one together. The key point here is that the
logistical problem of presenting the bodies of all of one's witnesses in
real time is a heavy burden in even a relatively short trial. Karl von
Clausewitz is famous for the elegant metaphor, "the fog of war" (or
"friction of war," depending upon translation), in which machinery does
not work and no one is exactly where he or she is supposed to be; 26 the
analogous metaphor, "the fog of trial," equally fits a presentation before
a jury, where a lone attorney functions without a military chain of
command but faces a comparably daunting task.
Thus, the naive question, "Why didn't the plaintiff just present the
live witness?," implies that there is no cost or difficulty in doing so.
Many of the rules are written from this perspective: that insistence upon
currently-testifying, live witnesses will sacrifice nothing-that there will
be no expense in bringing the witness to testify live, no likelihood of
loss of the evidence, and no other disadvantages. The assumption is
the
wildly at variance with reality. As von Clausewitz put it, because of
27
"fog" or "friction" of the endeavor, "the simplest thing is difficult."
These issues can be particularly acute for the appointed criminal
defense lawyer. This solitary combatant must, while multitasking,
physically produce reluctant, frightened, or unresponsive witnesses to
offer raw facts about alibi, self-defense, or lack of mens rea. Often, the
barriers are insurmountable. Consider the following explanation by one
defense lawyer:
"And I'm bringing in witnesses to say, 'No, he wasn't there.' And
witnesses are a problem ....I have people I'd love to have come in,

26. See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON, supra note 21, § 14.06-.07, at 482-86 (describing von
Clausewitz's tactical principles, including the "friction" of war, and the many ways in which these
principles apply to analogous contests such as trials); see also TOM CLANCY WITH FRED FRANKS,
INTO THE STORM: A STUDY OF COMMAND 2-10 (1997) (describing the Desert Storm invasion of
Iraq, and illustrating that the basic strategies explained by von Clausewitz are still dominant today).
27. See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON, supranote 21, § 14.06, at 482-83.
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and they won't come. I can't force them. In theory there is subpoena
power, but in fact if somebody said, 'I'm not going to come,'
28 they're
not going to come. A lot of these people are scared to death."

This excerpt describes war crimes defenses in an international tribunal,
but make no mistake: analogous effects in this country can be greater
rather than lesser. The description above covers witnesses fearful of
political reprisals from dismantled institutions, whereas witnesses in
domestic criminal trials involving, say, organized crime, must reckon
with more acute threats from ongoing disciplined enterprises.29
I tried criminal cases that had been set and reset more than a dozen
times, with the witnesses summoned each time, because that was
necessary. 30 I tried civil cases that had been similarly reset multiple
times. 31 On occasion, a reasonable, intelligent witness came to decide
that, after several reschedulings, enough was enough, and he or she
would not appear another time.32 Usually, this decision included a
perception that the American justice system was hopelessly ineffective,
as well as a sensible assessment of the resulting incursions on the
witness's own essential affairs. I saw instances in which courts kept
working people sitting on benches just outside the courtrooms for weeks
on end, losing significant wages, just to be sure they would be present in
case their testimony might be needed. Judges did this for a good reason:
the insistence of the rules on live testimony and the unpredictability of
contacting an "on call" witness with an expectation of immediate

28. John Council, Texas Attorneys Defend Clients Accused of Genocide in Rwanda, TEX.
LAW., Feb. 13, 2006, at 5, 7 (quoting remarks of criminal defense lawyer Tom Moran).
29. "What if a criminal defendant deliberately kills all of the witnesses against him to prevent
their testimony? They may have made statements,... but... these statements would be [excluded]
by the hearsay rule." PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 258 (2d ed. 1998); see also United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271,
1278-82 (1st Cir. 1996) (addressing numerous issues arising from evidence admitted under similar
circumstances). Rule 804(b)(6) partially addresses this issue but provides no relief when witnesses
simply absent themselves because they are fearful or distrustful of the criminal justice system--as
frequently happens--or when the opponent's conduct cannot be proved. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)
(forfeiture by wrongdoing).
30.

Cf, e.g., DAVID CRUMP & WILLIAM J. MERTENS, THE STORY OF A CRIMINAL CASE: THE

STATE V.ALBERTDELMAN GREENE 72-73 (2d ed. 2001) (tracing the history of a robbery case reset
for trial four times before actual trial).
31. See CRUMP & BERMAN, supra note 1, at 48-49 (depicting one of many subpoenas that
solo-practitioner plaintiff's attorney had to have served for each of the repetitive resets of this case);
cf, e.g., id. at 44-47 (tracing the history of a small-damages civil case reset for trial six times over
eight months before actual trial).
32. See, e.g., David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOus. L. REV. 34 n.165
(1997) [hereinafter Crump, IrrelevantEvidence] (describing one such case).
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appearance.33 I saw witnesses produced at great expense to prove
uncontested and tangential issues. I tried one case as an assistant district
attorney that involved a complex theft from the telephone company and
that required the assemblage of many witnesses from six different states.
I had no hope that my county government could pay the bill to bring
them all in; the expense was too great. Instead, the presentation of my
case depended upon the telephone company's willingness to fund the
travel of all of these witnesses. For an appointed defense attorney, this
issue of interstate witnesses arises less frequently, but with more intense
effects when it does arise.
Because of these kinds of considerations, when a lawyer prepares a
trial notebook, the first page usually is a directory of witnesses: alternate
telephone numbers, as many means of contact as possible, and notes
34
about which live bodies are going to be difficult to produce, and why.
The party with the burden of proof agonizes over the issue of physically
presenting that party's witnesses. So does the defense lawyer who
prepares to present an alibi or a self-defense claim.3 5 A plaintiff in a
midsize personal injury case treats this as a major problem, and foresight
may prompt the plaintiff's attorney to decline an otherwise viable case.3 6
It should be obvious that for either an individual or for a business entity,
the result is an enormous multiplication of the expense of litigation-an

33. Cf Brooks v. Brooks, 561 S.W.2d 949, 950-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (affirming denial of
continuance where lawyer arranged to call his client by telephone for trial but was unable to do so
because a defect, which the client promptly reported and had repaired, prevented his telephone from
ringing).
34. See WILLIAM V. DORSANEO Ill ET AL., TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL AND APPELLATE
PRACTICE 25-32 (4th ed. 2001) (showing the difficulty of obtaining continuance for want of
testimony, stating that inability to produce clients (or witnesses, by implication) at trial "is more
frequent than you might at first suppose" and that "[a]n attorney is well advised to obtain several
places through which to get in touch with" these persons); cf Charles W. Schwartz, Lecture at the
University of Houston Law Center, Trial Preparation, Part 1: Getting Discovery, Evidence,
Pleadings, Motions, and Orders in Trial Ready Form, at 15-1 (Aug. 18-19, 2005) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review) (placing the issue of securing witness attendance at the first page of the
Continuing Legal Education presentation on Trial Preparation).
35. Cf CRUMP & MERTENS, supra note 30, at 96-101 (showing a defense attorney's
presentation of four witnesses to support an alibi, but including only close relatives or friends who
could be expected to appear without subpoena, but also showing that in spite of reliance on
institutional documents, the defense attorney presented no witnesses from those institutions).
36. Cf CRUMP & BERMAN, supra note 1, at 126 (reproducing a plaintiffs attorney's
explanation that he was unable to obtain substantial damages in a slip-and-fall case because he did
not produce the plaintiff's physician, a tactic made necessary because the suit was "kind of a
marginal case" and "[he] would have had to pay the doctor [himself] for his time," but adding that
"if the case were taken by a [personal injury] specialist, he'd have paid to have the doctor there, but
then again, he wouldn't have taken the case in the first place").
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increase in cost that can make trial impractical, even to preserve a
thoroughly justified position.37
For some witnesses, the issue is deeper. Many witnesses find their
contacts with the justice system destructive, to say the least. Some would
rather go through virtually any other kind of unpleasant experience short
of open heart surgery. The incidentally involved witness who is kept on
the stand to be cross-examined for more than a week is an example.38
That experience is not merely time consuming; the attack is demeaning
and debilitating, even though it is encouraged systematically by our
evidentiary customs, since cross-examiners are motivated to exhaust
witnesses to precipitate mistakes. 39 The crime victim who is similarly
treated is a more compelling case, and the40child who testifies against her
abuser is a more compelling example still.
None of these issues excuses compliance with the rules. In
particular, none can avoid the effect, in criminal cases, of the
Confrontation Clause, which requires the live presence of some kinds of
witnesses. 41 My mention of the anecdotal information above is not
intended to argue to the contrary. Instead, I wish only to establish the
point that our heavy insistence on live testimony is not, in fact, cost-free,
although that point may not be always or even frequently considered.
Furthermore, there are issues of policy underlying evidence rules or their
interpretation that do not depend upon nonnegotiable requirements such
as the Confrontation Clause. I would argue for the consideration of the
difficulty and expense of producing live testimony as one factor to be

37. See generally Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1996) (analyzing the vanishing number of trials,
including cases in which both parties lose because the prevailing party expends more in trial
expense than the difference between the other side's settlement offer and the verdict).
38. See Crump, Irrelevant Evidence, supra note 32, at 37-39 n.185 (describing the crossexamination of a witness named Dennis Fung, which lasted nearly two weeks, with questions
reported as "so detailed and.., repetitive" that he was left tired and confused, or "weary and glum,"
as well as providing other examples, and analyzing the strategy that produces this result and
examining its purposes).
39. See id. at 32-39 (describing and providing examples of the "witness control or debilitation
function" of cross-examination, involving techniques enabling the examiner to "extend the
examination to any desired length," so that the witness becomes "sufficiently tired, frustrated, or
confused").
40. See id. at 34 (describing the effects of cross-examination on these victims). See David
Crump, Child Victim Testimony, Psychological Trauma, and the Confrontation Clause: What Can
the Scientific Literature Tell Us?, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 83, 105 (1992) (concluding
that surprisingly little is predictable, and explaining why a judge's determination that a particular
child is "tough" and "impervious to harm" may be seriously in error because precisely such children
may be "especially vulnerable to harm").
41. See infra Part 1lI.D.
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considered in deciding such an issue.42 Throughout this Article, I shall
provide examples of what I am talking about.
For the moment, one good example of my point is furnished by the
Federal Rules governing use of depositions at trial. The Federal Rules
require live testimony rather than depositions in almost all cases, subject
only to narrowly defined exceptions.4 3 Imagine a plaintiff who has
difficulty producing a particular live witness and who wishes to rely
instead upon a deposition of the witness. The plaintiff can argue:" n
The witness was under oath, as a deposition requires. The witness was
subject to cross examination, as a deposition requires, and was, in fact,
thoroughly cross examined. There was eye-to-eye confrontation,
because the defendant was present across the table, as opposing parties
often are at a deposition. And finally, although demeanor is a poor
method of evaluating truthfulness, this deposition was videotaped, and
the jury can fully evaluate the witness's demeanor.
In other words, the plaintiff can argue that all of the traditional
protections thought to be safeguarded by live testimony are present. 45
The deposition cannot, however, be properly used under the Federal
Rules under these conditions. Many states have changed this rule, to
allow free use of depositions,4 6 or to provide that depositions are usable
unless the opponent produces the witness.4 7 The Supreme Court and
Congress really should change the Federal Rule too. However, because
rule drafters seldom evaluate the erroneous, but facile, assumption of
easy presentation of live witnesses, the Federal Rule disallows most uses
of depositions.
The decision of the First Circuit in Frechette v. Welch 48 illustrates
the dismal results that this Federal Rule regarding depositions sometimes
produces. The witness at issue was a diagnosing physician. The
proponent offered the physician's testimony through a videotaped
deposition. The proponent pointed out that the parties had stipulated that
42. In addition to the example given here, see infra Part VIII.B (describing a potentially huge
but hidden expense imposed by unavailability conditions upon hearsay exceptions in Rule 804).
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32. Although it appears in the procedural rules, this Rule is really an
evidence rule, describing what is, in effect, an unavailability exception to the hearsay rule for
depositions, but one conditioned upon narrow requirements. See id.
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (prescribing requirements for depositions).
45. See infra Part I11.B (describing alleged hearsay risks and protections against them).
46. See DORSANEO ET AL., supra note 34, at 240 (describing the free use of depositions under
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, irrespective of availability).
47. See, e.g., N.H. R. EVID. 804(b) (allowing use of depositions where the witness is
unavailable).
48. 621 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1980).
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the deposition could be used for all purposes allowed under the laws of
New Hampshire, the forum state, which permitted depositions under the
circumstances.4 9 In addition, the proponent offered evidence of an
exception to the Federal Rule, in the form of a letter from the witness's
heart
own physician to the effect that the witness had suffered a recent
5°
attack, and argued that this fact made the witness unavailable.
The trial court admitted the evidence before the jury, but the First
Circuit held that this receipt of the deposition was error. 5' The Federal
Rule controlled, it said, not the parties' stipulation. The letter showed
only a heart attack, and it did not contain the further statement that the
witness was truly unable to appear due to illness.52 Furthermore, the
letter was hearsay, and it should not have been considered at all for
purposes of determining unavailability.5 3 This last conclusion was
especially dubious: issues concerning the effects of evidence rules do not
normally require information conforming to the rules of evidence
themselves,5 4 and the court's reasoning was tantamount to a requirement
that live evidence must be produced to prove the unavailability of live
evidence. The Federal Rule, therefore, required that the proponent
produce the witness live rather than using his deposition. That was the
Court of Appeals' holding, meaning that the use of the deposition was
error. Then, however, the court concluded, against all reason, that the
error was harmless,55 even though it provided direct expert evidence
governing the central issue in the case. This transparent judicial fudging
produced a sound outcome, even though it made sense only in light of a
dysfunctional rule that the court perhaps realized it had interpreted
poorly.
The arguments that I shall make in this Article support the revision
of the Federal Rule governing depositions, and they support a different
interpretation of that rule than the First Circuit's reading. My larger
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 13 n.1.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 13 n.1.
53. Id.
54. Specifically, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to the determination of facts that
govern evidentiary predicates. See FED. R. EVID. I101(d)(1) (providing that the rules "do not apply
to" the "determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence"). Strictly
speaking, this Rule may not govern an issue covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it
is anomalous to admit evidence subject to loosely proven predicates specified by hearsay exceptions
containing none of the protections against recognized hearsay risks, while setting stringent and
nearly unattainable requirements of proof of predicates for depositions, which usually reflect all of
these protections.
55. See Frechette,621 F.2d at 14.
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thesis, however, is that many exclusionary principles in the rules of
evidence are so dysfunctional in general that they should be severely
pruned. Still, it is not necessary for the reader to agree with me on that
broad front for the point to be useful. There are many instances in which
my arguments would support modest revisions of individual rulesrevisions that might appeal to some readers. The difficulty for the
evidence proponent posed by a rigid insistence upon live witnesses is
one perspective that drives these arguments.
C. The Complexity Effect in DecisionmakingUnder FormalRules
The conclusions of this Article are also driven by a concern for the
right amount of formalism in rules, including rules of evidence. What do
I mean by "the right amount of formalism"? All that I am trying to
engender is an appreciation of the possibility that the complexity of
formal rules is a "Goldilocks problem." When Goldilocks tried the first
bowl of porridge, it was too hot; the second was too cold; the third was
just right. Similarly, some kinds of problems require solutions that avoid
both not enough, at one end, and too much at the other.56 There is a level
that is just right, and more is not better, even though less or none at all
may not be better either. Accordingly, the introduction of formal rules
can enhance satisfactory decisionmaking. The concept that a
decisionmaker should follow a prescribed set of steps is thought to
provide better results not only in the law, but in other fields as well.5 7
What gets lost, however, particularly in rulemaking, is the concern at the
opposite end: the possibility that, if the prescribed set of steps is too
expensive, abstract, or divorced from direct concerns-if it is too formal,
in other words-it may begin to interfere with satisfactory
decisionmaking.
The simplified figure that accompanies these words attempts to put
this idea into a graph.58 The horizontal axis is the complexity of formal
decisionmaking, and the vertical axis is the degree to which the resulting
decisionmaking is satisfactory. Obviously, neither of these qualities is

56. An analogous "right level" problem concerns the very different issue of punitive damages.
Too much produces overkill, which causes producers of products and services to expend safety
resources wastefully, whereas too little produces inadequate safety. See David Crump, Evidence,
Economics, and Ethics: What Information Should Jurors Be Given to Determine the Amount of a
Punitive-DamageAward?, 57 MD. L. REv. 174, 190-201 (1998) [hereinafter Crump, Information]
(developing this point by economic analysis).
57. See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON, supra note 21, § 6.02, at 182-85 (describing due diligence
in business decisionmaking as consisting of prescribed formal steps).
58. It is believed that this simple figure is unique with the author.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/6

14

Crump: The Case for Selective Abolition of the Rules of Evidence
2006]

SELECTIVE ABOLITION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

The Complexity Effect in Formal Decisionmaking

Decisionmaking
Quality

-

Complexity of Formal Procedures

precisely measurable, and, in fact, neither is easy to define. The graph
should be considered loosely, in the same way as illustrative depictions
of social cost curves by economists 59: as an aid to visualizing a
theoretical relationship, rather than as a mathematical construct. At the
left side of the curve, there are few formal procedures. A factory or firm
makes a major decision, such as hiring a division head, without a
checklist requiring it to generate candidates, interview them, check
references, or the like; or, a monarch settles a dispute between two
citizens with no rules of evidence or substance, in the manner of King
Solomon. 60 The result may be a poor decision, one influenced by biases
such as availability or anchoring. The addition of a few formal processes
increases the quality of the decision, on average. More formalism may
increase it further. A point is reached eventually, however, at which the
relative complexity of formal constraints seems likely to produce the
most enhanced decision, all factors considered. Beyond that point,
increases in formal constraints have a negative effect. They serve to

59.
curves).

See, e.g., Crump, Information, supra note 56, at 191, 193-94 (providing examples of cost

60. See I Kings 3:16-28 (King
psychological trick of suggesting that a
awarded the baby to the contestant who
King Solomon apparently arrived at this

James). The Bible reports that the monarch used the
baby be cut in half to dispose of a maternity dispute, then
was willing to surrender her son rather than see him killed.
procedure idiosyncratically, without any formal rules.
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cramp decisionmaking rather than enhance it. At some point, in other
words, more formality serves only to produce a worse decision. 61
Again, it should be emphasized that this visualization tool is
imprecise and theoretical. In a way, it depicts the clash of two
jurisprudential philosophies, those of the legal realists and the process
school. Justice Holmes, who was nothing if not a realist, argued that the
"felt necessities of the times," or judges' discretionary decisions about
what would be best, was a greater influence on legal decisionmaking
than formal logic. 62 The process school, on the other hand, reacted to the
perceived excesses of this viewpoint because it implied no limits upon a
judge's ability to inflict idiosyncratic or even malevolent preferences
upon the citizenry. As a corrective, the process school called for formal
procedures that would remain consistent from decision to decision.6 3 The
right balance between these two philosophies, which arguably are aimed
at different concerns, although both have appeal, is the issue that I am
raising here.
When it comes to evidence rules, formal processes are appropriate,
but I would argue that we sometimes neglect the upper end of the
Goldilocks problem: the issue of excessive formalism. A rule that has
three formal elements can always be rewritten to incorporate four, or
five, or six. The additional elements may be aimed at sound policy
justifications, in fact. But when we increase the number of formal
elements, we increase the cost and difficulty of compliance, and we may
introduce distracting factual arguments, create legal ambiguities, and
produce less satisfactory decisions. I would say that we have reached
this point with some hearsay principles, such as the unavailability
definition, 64 and with the long list of requirements for expert opinion
evidence (some with multiple sub-requirements).65 When there are as
many as eight separate requirements 66 for the introduction of a particular
61. Thus, this Article contains examples of formal processes so costly or complex that they
threatened to confuse or distort the decision. See, e.g., supra notes 29, 32, 35-36 and accompanying
text.
62. See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON, supra note 21, § 10.02, at 325-29 (describing the legal
realists). The culmination of this kind of reasoning was pervasive indeterminacy, such as the
"ethical relativism" of Edward Westermarck, who argued that moral judgments could not be said to
"possess objective validity," that nothing was provably "good or bad, right or wrong," and that
moral principles could not "express anything more than the opinions of those who believe in them."
Id. § 7.04, at 234-36.
63. See id. § 7.04, at 236.
64. See infra Part VIII.B (analyzing cost effects of these requirements).
65. See infra Part V (analyzing cost, complexity, and error-inducing aspects of the law
governing expert testimony).
66. See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
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kind of information before the jury, the vagueness of the criteria and the
proliferation of factual issues guarantee that the determination will be
exceedingly costly, and unless the standards are written with
extraordinary skill, the opponent will find a promising point of attack
even when policy would expeditiously admit the evidence. It might be
better to guide the judge by a single standard, or two, or three, rather
than eight or more. This idea-that the advantages of formal processes
reach a limit with increasing complexity-is another of the concerns that
drives this Article. Throughout it, I shall point out examples of rules or
groups of rules that I think defeat their purposes because of an excess of
formal complexity.
D. Will Elimination of Exclusionary Rules Really Increase the
Frequency ofJury Trials, and Would This Really Be a Good Thing?
1. The Effects of Evidentiary Rules on the Vanishing Trial
No one can know with certainty whether the proposals I have made
here will truly increase trials. Since these approaches have not been
tested, there is no statistical means of proving or disproving the point. I
believe, however, that they will lead to an increase in trials, for the
following reasons.
First, rulings on evidence consume a large portion of the time spent
in a jury trial, and these proposals probably would reduce that time,
although they would not eliminate it. As a means of testing this
hypothesis, I considered the record in one simple jury trial, a slip-and67
fall case, lasting about two days. By my estimate, evidentiary
objections, arguments, compliance mechanisms, and rulings occupied
about one-third of the duration of this particular trial, or in other words,
they increased the length of trial by about fifty percent. In coming to this
conclusion, I included the time spent hearing motions and evidentiary
68
issues related to rulings that occurred on the eve of trial. In summary,
eliminating this time spent on evidentiary issues would, by itself, free up
69
an estimated thirty-three percent of the time now spent in trial and
67. See generally CRUMP & BERMAN, supra note I (reproducing proceedings in a slip-and-fall
case).
68. See id. at 47-48, 50-51 (providing examples of a motion in limine requiring a hearing, and
excerpts from an immediate pretrial hearing considering complex issues surrounding whether
medical records, as hearsay, fit the business records exception).
69. Generalizing this finding from a single case is, of course, debatable. One can argue,
however, that complex cases can be expected to create more evidentiary issues for the time they
consume than this single slip-and-fall case did. At the extreme, capital murder trials frequently last
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would enable us to increase the percentage of trials by an analogous
percentage, without any additional resources. The proposals offered here
would not eliminate all of the time spent in this manner because my
suggestion includes retaining some exclusionary principles, particularly
Rules 401 through 403, in a modified form, 70 but they would
substantially decrease other evidentiary issues concerning hearsay,
expert opinion, repetitive conduct, and authentication.
Second, the current rules mean that the evidence appears in a
disorganized order. The sequence of witnesses is often dictated by
availability rather than by the logic of presentation. 7' This
disorganization requires drawing and redrawing of the relationship
among evidentiary points. When a second witness is called after a first
witness whose testimony is relevant only because of the second witness,
attorneys must spend large amounts of time reorienting the jury so that
the connection is clear. The time spent in this manner should not be
minimized; advice to lawyers about how to conduct a direct examination
stresses this idea of redrawing the picture or reorienting the jury.72 The
proposals at issue here would decrease this effect by allowing greater
use of pretrial testimony, such as depositions, and greater use of repeated
statements of witnesses; these proposals would shorten trials for this
73
reason.
Third, the revision suggested later in this Article, in Rules 401 and
402, would empower and encourage the judge to eliminate evidence of
very slight relevance-relevance so slight that it cannot be expected to
influence a reasonable juror.74 One might think that the Rules already
further this goal, but actually they fall short. Some judges accomplish
the purpose by interpretation of Rules 401 through 403, which
eliminates long-string evidence, and some find other devices, such as
rules limiting cross to the scope of direct, to accomplish the same thing
even more artificially; other judges permit the development of evidence
with only the slightest connection to anything in the case. The Rules are
several months, during which defense counsel will have the understandable motive to raise and
argue every conceivable evidentiary point. See DAVID CRUMP & GEORGE JACOBS, A CAPITAL CASE

INAMERICA 32-33, 35, 44, 64 (2000) (describing pretrial and trial proceedings in a capital case).
70. See infra Part VII.
71. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
72. Cf David Crump & Joe W. Redden, Jr., Lecture at the University of Houston Law Center,
Testimony from Your Own Witnesses: Direct Examination Strategies, The Jury Trial, Part 8, at 4-6
(Aug. 18-19, 2005) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (emphasizing the need for frequent
reorientation of the jury during evidence presentation).
73. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
74.

See infra Part VII.
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not currently written in a manner that expressly requires the judge to
consider this issue. Part VII will explain why, in greater depth. At the
same time, attorneys have strong incentives for the use of marginally
relevant evidence, often for the very purpose of lengthening
examinations. The proposals contained here would reduce this effect by
giving the judge a mandatory rule requiring the elimination of evidence
too attenuated to make a difference.
Finally, the rules at issue here would allow for the enforcement of
relatively strict limits on the time consumed by single-witness
examinations or by each side's cumulative presentations in a jury trial.
These kinds of limits are difficult to impose or enforce under our current
regime. But simplification of the form in which the evidence is received,
better organization of witnesses, and elimination of highly marginal
evidence would allow us to adopt rules such as those proposed in Part
IX, requiring the judge to impose time limits in advance-generous and
flexible, to be sure, but almost certainly effective in reducing waste of
time, nevertheless.
Would an Increase in Percentages of Trials (Without New
Resources) Be a Good or a Bad Thing?
Then, there is the separate question: Would an increase in the
frequency of jury trials be a good thing? I believe it would, again for
several reasons. First, the decrease in trials results, in large measure,
75
from an increased use of judge-imposed dispositions on points of law.
There is no clear way of knowing, but I doubt that there has been an
increase in cases worthy of this disposition comparable to the number of
cases thus eliminated. In other words, many of the cases may reflect
judicial fudging in which judges stretch to force cases into categories
capable of disposition on pure points of law. Summary judgment by
evidence elimination or by inferences properly left to juries, disposition
by sanctions, and deadline enforcement seem especially suspect in this
regard. This Article will return to this point in Part VIII.
Second, other dispositions are the result of settlements. It is a good
thing that a very high percentage of our cases result in settlement
because we cannot afford the resources to handle every dispute by a fullblown jury trial. But when the number of trials declines to such a low
level, one begins to suspect that some settlements would not be reached
if trials were more readily available. In fact, the prospect of the
vanishing trial means that judges will manage cases with heavy-handed
2.

75.

See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:585

encouragement of settlement firmly in mind because they simply must
do so-or they will have so many cases over which to preside that they
cannot do justice to any of them.76 And so, as is developed in greater
depth in Part VIII below, the judge must adopt strategies for
precipitating settlement. One of the simplest judicial strategies is to
make rulings that escalate costs and risks for the party who, in the
judge's opinion, is most likely to be preventing settlement by

recalcitrance. 7 The trial statistics strongly suggest that this party is
likely to be one that is firmly convinced of the rightness of a particular
position.7 8 Thus, many of the settled cases may include those in which
the judge has forcefully persuaded a party that has faith in the justice of
the cause to settle. This party, then, has accepted a far lesser sum, or has
paid a far greater sum, than is believed to be owed. 79
Third and finally, the rules probably result in the settlement of cases
that would better be tried. What is meant, here, by "cases that would
better be tried"? I believe that the rules discourage trials of some cases in
which factual issues are closely contested, and that they increase the

percentage of cases in which trials occur simply because the rules create
opportunity for arguments about exclusion of relevant, reliable,
important evidence of a kind that would result in rational settlements if
the rules made admissibility clearer. In other words, the Rules distort the
playing field, and they distort settlement distribution, by mandating

exclusion of powerful and relevant evidence from some cases, or by
precipitating a situation in which evidence admissibility can be tested
only by actually going to trial. 80 This means that trials of cases in which

76. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 376 (1982), reprinted in CRUMP
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, § 8.02, at 467-69 (discussing judicial case
management); cf Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the lower court
abused its discretion in sanctioning appellant for failure to settle); CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS, supra note 2, § 8.02, at 472-73 (discussing Kothe and other cases in light of federal
courts' power to sanction for failure to settle).
77. See, e.g., Syntek Capital, AG v. Welch, No. 05-CV-180, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17569, at
*6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2006) ("While parties cannot be compelled to settle a case, a court is
authorized to conduct settlement conferences and to compel the parties and their counsel to attend
the conferences and to participate in negotiations in good faith."); see also G. Heileman Brewing
Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989).
78. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 37, at 29 tbl.16 (illustrating pretrial bargaining patterns
from 1990-1991).
79. See id. at 40-43 (concluding that there is usually a clear winner and a clear loser at trial).
80. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and ProposalforReform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441,490-91 (1997) ("[l~n the civil context there
is greater pressure to settle lawsuits out of court.... This delay may, in large part, be a result of the
complex rules of evidence that have evolved to prevent jurors from misusing certain types of
evidence....").
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there should be genuine dispute about the facts will be elbowed out by
cases that would result in settlement if evidentiary rules were not so
rigidly exclusionary: if they did not distort the outcomes by the reality
(or the risk, which amounts to the same thing) that information useful to
a rational decisionmaker will be suppressed. Again, this Article will reevaluate these issues in Part VIII, after putting forward more specific
arguments about the exclusionary rules.
Unfortunately, I do not think that rule drafters consider these issues
very seriously when they propose amendments. The immediate effect of
a single rule becomes dominant in the debate over amendments, with
consideration usually focused on the question whether the rule, in its
existing form, might admit some evidence that could be unreliable. The
question of costs and benefits, or the cumulative effect of the various
exclusions, gets lost, and the achievement of artificial policies expressed
81
in the existing rules becomes of overriding importance. The question
whether the cumulative effect is to decrease the percentage of trials, or
whether that effect is a bad thing, seldom merits much discussion. The
arguments I have made in this section are difficult to prove or disprove,
but the real point is that we have constructed a set of evidence rules that
have serious influence on the underlying questions about ultimate effects
on trials or outcomes-and we have done so without trying to answer
those questions.
III.

THE HEARSAY RULE AS A HISTORICAL ACCIDENT: HAVE WE

PUSHED IT BEYOND ITS LOGIC?

The hearsay rule is probably the most extensive of our exclusionary
principles. 82 It provides that a statement uttered other than as current
testimony is excluded if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.83 The effect of the rule is to eliminate the use of a nontestifying
declarant as a historical narrator. It means, in the plain-English
formulation that I use in introducing neophytes to the subject, that "you
can't testify about someone else's version of the facts in court."
The rule originated in response to historical events in England that
have little to do with practice today: abuses in the Court of Star
Chamber. For example, trial was deliberately done by affidavit to
See, e.g., supranote 23 and accompanying text.
Its coverage consumes more than one-fourth of Waltz and Park's text, JON R. WALTZ &
of
ROGER C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 2004), and a comparable amount
ed.
(2d
PROBLEMS
AND
MATERIALS
CASES,
EVIDENCE:
AL.,
ET
Rothstein's, PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN
1998), both exclusive of appendices.
83. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (definition); FED. R. EVID. 802 (exclusion).
81.
82.
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insulate from cross-examination witnesses held incommunicado and
tortured or threatened with torture, leaving investigation of the accuracy
of the resulting narratives severely restricted.84 A significant inciting
event was the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for what was charged as a
conspiracy against the King, in which the evidence included hearsay
from an alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham, who had retracted his
declaration, as well as a narrative quoted from a declarant in another
country.85 Raleigh's objection was not directed solely at the hearsay
nature of the narrative as such, but also at its flimsiness to support
conviction for crime: "This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggarly
priest; but what proof is it against me? ' 86 The .later reaction to these
abuses assured that the hearsay rule would come to be entrenched in
English, and therefore in American, jurisprudence.8 7
But the costs of the hearsay rule have been too infrequently
considered. These costs are many, and they are high.
A.

The Costs of a General Rule Against Hearsay

The hearsay rule now applies in American courts from top to
bottom, with episodic exceptions for very small claims in some
jurisdictions.8 8 If a citizen sues a sloppy business for taking the citizen's
money without performing properly, the hearsay rule will limit the
evidence available to the citizen to prove the case. For example, a
written estimate of repair costs will likely be inadmissible. Likewise, if
an injured person sues another whose negligence is alleged to have
caused the injury, the hearsay rule limits the evidence. 89 A criminal
defendant who seeks to offer evidence of the commission of the crime
by another will see the best available evidence excluded-the ostensibly
credible confession of the alleged other perpetrator-with the court

84.

See I JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 338

(William S.Hein & Co., Inc. 1976) (1883).
85. See WALTZ & PARK, supra note 82, at 97-98.
86. Id. at 98. For an earlier source, see JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, THE HISTORY AND
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 162 (1850).

87. See WALTZ & PARK, supra note 82, at 97.
88. Cf FED. R. EVID. 101(b) (declaring the applicability of the hearsay rule "generally to
civil actions and proceedings" and "criminal cases and proceedings," subject to express exceptions).
89. See, e.g., Ex parte Stutts, 897 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. 2004) (demonstrating that proof
related to the cost of repairs was only admissible during sentencing); Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres,
Inc., 114 N.W.2d 466, 468-70 (Wis. 1962) (excluding a statement by an usher, at the theatre, which
was relevant to the determination of liability in a slip-and-fall case). This result would probably
change under Rule 801 (d)(2)(D).
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90
remarking, perhaps, that "the holding might seem absurd to a layman."
The result is the removal of good evidence from the process, the
lengthening of trials, and the confusion of narratives.
?9
Consider a simple case as an example. Leake v. Hagert ' appears in
at least one evidence casebook-that of Professor Paul F. Rothstein et
al.-where it is used to demonstrate both the workings of the hearsay
92
rule and the loss of good evidence that the rule creates. The case was a
fender-bender, in which Leake claimed that Hagert had negligently
driven her automobile into the back of a plow that Leake was towing on
the highway. Hagert counterclaimed for her own damages, alleging that
Leake had been negligent in operating his vehicle "upon a public
highway after sunset, without proper lights, reflectors, or other
warnings., 93 The contested evidence was the testimony of an insurance
investigator, who repeated a statement from Leake's son, who was said
to have stated that the "red lens" on the "small rear light on the tractor"
94 The trial court
driven by Leake "had been out for some time.,
evidently considered this statement good evidence, because it admitted
it. The state supreme court, however, applied the hearsay rule (correctly,
according to its terms) and found reversible error. "The hearsay rule
prohibits use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony of the
fact asserted," wrote the court. 95 It added, "Leake's son did not testify in
the present action; he was not a party to the action ... and he was not
available as a witness at the time of trial because he was in the Army and
overseas." 96 For all that appears in the opinion, it would have cost many
times the amount in controversy, and many times her damages, for
Hagert to have brought her opponent's son home from "overseas" for a
visit. However, if Hagert wanted the evidence, this kind of wasteful
expenditure would have been called for.
Imagine that Hagert had been involved in another type of activity,
such as purchasing a residence, buying a business, hiring an employee,
or deciding which university to attend. The amount at stake might be
much greater than the dollars in controversy in her fender-bender. Yet no

90. See, e.g., State v. English, 159 S.E. 318, 320 (N.C. 1931) (Brogden, J., dissenting). The
result would remain the same under the Federal Rules, despite Rule 804(b)(3), unless there is
corroboration strong enough to "clearly indicate" the trustworthiness of the confession. See, e.g.,
State v. Landrum, 559 N.E.2d 710, 720 (Ohio 1990).
91. 175 N.W.2d 675 (N.D. 1970).
92. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, § 3.01, at 73-74.
93. Leake, 175 N.W.2d at 680.
94. Id. at 683.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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one would attempt to settle these kinds of major controversies without
reliance on hearsay. In fact, most of what the parties would rely upon in
Hagert's hypothetical home purchase would be hearsay, in the form of
engineering reports, title reports, inspection reports, appraisals, and
literally dozens of other items of unvarnished hearsay. 97 Sensibly, we
routinely rely upon these kinds of hearsay in bigger matters. But not in
litigation; not even in small litigation such as Leake v. Hagert, and not
even if the costs of exclusion transparently exceed the benefits.
The hearsay rule excludes good evidence. It did so in Leake v.
Hagert. The declarant was, after all, the son of the party against whom
the evidence was offered. The statement used clear language that was
not likely to be the subject of misunderstanding. It carried little risk of
mistaken perception.9 8 Furthermore, the hearsay rule results in an
inability to prove facts that are subject to investigation and clear
determination. In an equivalent situation involving the purchase of a
residence, for example, hearsay results of investigations would be freely
relied upon to resolve conflicts between the interests of the two parties. 99
Even when nonhearsay evidence can be supplied, the draconian
insistence of our legal system on the physical presence of each witness
vastly increases the cost of trial, especially in small cases like Leake v.
Hagert. The rule against hearsay is not applied to any other kind of
important decision---only to litigation of the traditional, court-oriented
variety. In fact, most alternate methods of dispute resolution, including
arbitration, feature agreements that contract out of the Rules of
Evidence.' 00 In other words, parties who use common devices today to
control their own processes virtually uniformly agree to abolish these
complex rules that our system has contrived to exclude evidence. Even
when proof is available in traditional litigation, the law's insistence upon
blanket exclusion of hearsay means that evidence is presented
disjointedly and wastefully. The hearsay rule is hideously difficult for
ordinary lawyers to apply, 10 1 and when it is misapplied to receive
97.

See generally DAVID CRUMP & JEROME J. CURTIS, JR., THE ANATOMY OF A REAL

PROPERTY TRANSACTION 7-10, 25 (1984) (reproducing major documents and events during typical
residential purchase and sale).
98. For these reasons, the recognized hearsay risks were minimized and the protections
against them diminished in importance. See infra Part III.B.
99. For example, written reports of inspectors would enable the parties to determine whether
defects would exceed the repair allowance expressed in their contract. See CRUMP & CURTIS, supra
note 97, at 7-10, 25 (reproducing excerpts from a repair allowance in a typical contract and an
engineering report based on an inspection).
100. See CRUMPET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 775.
101. The concept of a statement not offered "for the truth of the matter stated" is such that
attorneys and students often confuse it. This is only one aspect of the definition of hearsay that
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evidence, as it was in the trial of Leake v. Hagert, or when it results in
the erroneous exclusion of evidence, as it also does, 0 2 it leads to results
at variance with the merits, or to expensive relitigation.
These disadvantages would be more readily tolerable if they were
offset by resulting gains. But the hearsay rule is not uniformly needed to
achieve the benefits it is asserted to have. This Article will turn next to
that issue.
B.

The PurposesAssertedly Served by the HearsayRule

Hearsay is said to involve a number of risks. Among these are
perceptivity, qualification, sincerity, expression, and bias.' 03 Perceptivity
refers to the opportunity for observation of the phenomenon by the
witness. For example, Leake's son might not have seen the lens on the
small red light when the tractor was operating, or he might have seen it
only from such a distance that its operation was not unambiguously
known to him. Qualification refers to the ability of the witness to
process, retain, and report what he allegedly observed. The son might
have been functionally blind or so ignorant of the operation of lights on
vehicles that his report was unreliable. Next, sincerity means the
tendency of the witness to avoid deliberate falsehood. It is possible that
the son told the insurance adjuster that the light was "out" when he knew
that in fact it was in perfect working order. Expression refers to the
semiotics of the situation: the meaning, to both the son and the jurors
who would listen to his reported remark, of the symbols contained in the
reference to a "small light" and a "lens" that had been "out for some
time." When the son used the words, "out for some time," he may have
meant something other than what most of us would understand his
remark to mean; he might have meant, for example, that the light blinked
or buzzed, not that it did not operate, or that it was not covered by a red
lens, or that it was only partially red-covered. Bias, of course, refers to
cognitive blockages of truth in even sincere witnesses. The son might
have hated his father to such an extent that, even while attempting to tell
the truth, he attributed a carelessness in the maintenance of the light to
his father that did not exist.
causes confusion; there are others. Casebooks usually contain repeated examples for students. See
sources cited supra note 82.
102. See, e.g., Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1085
(7th Cir. 1981).
103. For slightly different formulations of these risks that overlap this description, see WALTZ
& PARK, supra note 82, at 105; Lawrence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957,
958-61 (1974).
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These risks do not sound very persuasive in the context of Leake v.
Hagert. Furthermore, they are not risks that require sophistication to
evaluate. 10 4 Jurors are not incapable of inferring and considering them.
In fact, these risks are present whenever live witnesses testify, and they
never can be quantified or eliminated no matter how many procedures,
of however much complexity, we happen to put in place. 0 5
Nevertheless, in response to the hearsay risks, the legal system poses a
number of processes that are designed to control them. In fact,
psychological studies strongly indicate that observers do no better than
pure chance in evaluating live witnesses, 0 6 and some studies suggest
that they do better, actually, when unable to see the speaker;10 7 these
considerations forcefully undermine some of the arguments for
excluding hearsay. In any event, the four processes that are most often
mentioned are demeanor, eye-to-eye confrontation, the oath, and crossexamination. 10 8 As we shall see, these processes are not the only ways to
enable the jury to exercise the judgment that will reduce hearsay risks,
and several of them are of doubtful efficacy.
Demeanor refers to the physical appearance of the witness while
testifying, which the jury can observe as a purported aid to the detection
of falsehood. Did the witness wipe his hands? Hesitate? Look down at
the floor? Do these behaviors indicate probable falsehood, uncertainty,
or bias? Actually, no. They do not. The psychological experiments
thoroughly debunk the theory that these behaviors are sound inputs for
detection of falsehood.' 0 9 In fact, the psychology of demeanor tends to
support the concept that people are better judges of truth if they cannot
observe the speaker.110 It seems that people are about as good (or bad) at
appearing to tell the truth when they are not, or at accidentally creating
the appearance of falsehood when testifying truthfully, as they are in lie
detection by demeanor. In fact, the acting abilities of good liars probably
outstrip the ability of observers to catch them. Arguably, people are not
104. Evaluating these risks is simple compared to, for example, judging the credibility of
admissible statistical, scientific, or engineering testimony from dueling expert witnesses. See
discussion infra Part V.

105. Cf., e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 312 n. I (6th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the
risks inherent in eyewitness testimony, when presented live, by both the majority and dissent).
106. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1078-88 (1991)
(discussing psychological studies).
107. See id. at 1088.

108. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, § 3.01, at 73.
109. See generally Wellborn, supra note 106, at 1075, 1078-88

(discussing "mounting

experimental evidence against the utility of demeanor" in assessing credibility, but noting, however,
that this proposition "contradicts orthodox legal assumptions").
110. See id. at 1088.
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incapable of detecting falsehood, but they do so better by textual or
content analysis of the communication."' Demeanor is not a good
reason for the hearsay rule, but rather a distraction.
There may be something more to the idea of physical confrontation,
but not much more. Psychological experiments show that physical
proximity is a factor in people's ability to disadvantage others. There is
some evidence, in other words, that facial confrontation in which the
speaker or subject is not anonymous makes the speaker less capable of
adverse action against the subject. 1 2 But the fact that a witness may be
more hesitant to say something adverse to a litigant who is present
hardly means that we are more likely to get the truth as a result of eyeto-eye confrontation. We do not enhance the quality of information that
we collect by confronting the reporter with all of the adverse
consequences that might flow from a truthful answer, and, in fact, we
often enhance it, instead, by removing disincentives to truth-telling." 3
As for the oath, it seems likely that it has something to do with
enhancing truth, but again, not as much as one might like to hope.' 14 In
the first place, the oath influences only the so-called sincerity risk. It
does not counteract defects in perceptivity, qualification, expression, or
bias, except to the extent that it may suppress less-than-perfect certainty
altogether-and then, it seems as likely to suppress truth as falsehood.
Although the oath probably does have something to do with
counteracting the sincerity risk in some witnesses, it does so imperfectly,
and it may result in an imbalance that leads to poor truth detection. If a
witness impressed by the oath confesses diligently to all uncertainties,
while an opposing witness who takes his swearing more casually
expresses a false but convincing certainty to the contrary, the so-called
in third-party evaluations-and the oath
"Othello error" causes mistakes
15
much.
us
help
does not
Ill.

Seeid.atll04-05.

112. Stanley Milgram's experiments showed this effect in a disturbing way. A phony
"experimenter" (who actually was a stooge) persuaded experimental subjects to impose what they
thought were painful electric shocks on another person who made mistakes in what was falsely
presented as a learning experiment. The willingness of subjects to impose these "shocks" was
enhanced by physical factors, such as the close proximity of the authority and the distance of the
person harmed (e.g., by walling the learner off in another room). CRUMP, HOW TO REASON, supra
note 21, § 11.06, at 385-86.
113. This, in fact, is one reason for reposing more faith in double-blind experiments, in which
neither the subject nor the observer is biased by knowing whether the subject is part of the
experimental group or the control group. Id. § 13.03, at 449.

114. See Wellborn, supra note 106, at 1078-91.
115. This effect is so well recognized in the literature that it has a name: the "Othello error,"
because it is illustrated by Othello's mistaken interpretation of Desdemona's reaction to Othello's
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Finally, there is cross-examination, which is indeed a valuable tool
for discovery of truth, if a potentially overrated one. Cross-examination
gives us text and context. A disinterested observer comes away with
more parts of the story to compare to others. Furthermore, crossexamination may uncover defects in perceptivity, qualification, sincerity,
expression, and bias. "When you use the word 'red,' Leake's son, you
really don't know what it means, do you?" "No, I don't; I don't speak
English very well, and I get 'red' mixed up with 'green."' "And before
the accident, Leake's son, it had been months since you'd seen the
light?" "That's correct. My observations were from another time
altogether, and I have no idea whether my father fixed the light after I
saw it, but before the accident." If this is not enough, we can elicit
evidence of bias from the witness: "Yes, it's true, I hate my father and
I'd like to see him lose this case."
This hypothetical dialogue, of course, is wildly improbable, and
hence my assertion is that cross-examination is overrated. The
psychological studies, in fact, strongly support the inference that crossexamination can sometimes interfere with, rather than enhance, accurate
credibility determinations."l 6 One striking experiment, for example,
showed that experienced cross-examiners were no better than amateurs
in questioning identification eyewitnesses to produce accurate
evaluations of their testimony by neutral decisionmakers-and, in fact,
neither did better than chance!" l 7 This study paints a dismal picture of
the efficacy of cross-examination, if not of our entire system of justice.
In any event, there are several responses to the assertion that a
uniform exclusion of hearsay evidence is preferable to evidence without
cross-examination. I conclude that cross-examination is far more
valuable in some situations than in others, that it can be substituted for
by available means short of throwing out all hearsay, and that the
existing rules themselves demonstrate this point-but they achieve
results that are random and arbitrary rather than principled.

inaccurate accusation of infidelity. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 5, sc. 2; PAUL
EKMAN, TELLING LIES 169-70 (rev. ed. 2001); Wellborn, supra note 106, at 1081 (citing Charles F.
Bond Jr. & William E. Fahey, False Suspicion and the Misperception of Deceit, 26 BRIT. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 41, 41 (1987)).
116. See EKMAN, supra note 115, at 162-89; Bond & Fahey, supra note 115, at 41. In fact,
Professor Charles McCormick suggested that "it is ... the honest but weak or timid witness, rather
than the rogue, who most often goes down under the fire of cross-examination." EDWARD W.
CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 31, at 68-69 (3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).

117. See R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Fergus J. O'Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate
and InaccurateEyewitnesses, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336-38 (1989).
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The Case Against Solving These Problems by Blanket Exclusion

The question is not whether cross-examination of nearly every
hearsay declarant would be potentially valuable. The answer to that
question is: "It potentially would be." Instead, the question is whether
cross-examination is so uniformly valuable and so impervious to
substitutes that it should be regarded as essential in all cases, so that
information that itself may be valuable, such as the son's statement in
Leake v. Hagert, should be flatly excluded. I do not think so.
In the first place, as I have asserted above, jurors are not incapable
of perceiving the risks that the law has identified as inherent in hearsay
evidence (and that in fact are inherent in all evidence, including
testimony from live witnesses). We do not know from systematic means
just how likely jurors are to perceive all of these risks on their own,
unaided-but that is not the point either, because the opponent of the
evidence can debunk the value of a given piece of hearsay evidence, just
as the opponent can debunk the veracity of a witness. For example, we
can imagine one such situation in Leake: "The son of my client, Leake,
wasn't here. Hagert's lawyer could have brought him here if she wanted.
The son may not have seen the light recently, may have been incapable
of telling whether it was out, may have been lying when he talked to the
insurance investigator, and may hate his father. And what did he mean
by the phrase, 'out for some time'? It proves nothing, ladies and
gentlemen of the jury."
I have only anecdotal evidence to offer about this question of jury
awareness of hearsay risks, and I do not know that we have anything
better, pro or con. But my experience was striking. Back in the days
when I regularly tried criminal cases, the law of my state provided that
of insanity.' 18
only a jury could acquit an indicted defendant on grounds
There were some cases in which the prosecutor and defense lawyer
agreed that the defendant was insane and merited acquittal; in fact,
although there were many cases where this agreement did not result,
cases of agreement about insanity were common. Neither side in such a
case wanted to waste a full-blown jury trial to resolve the non-issue that
each side had agreed to, and certainly the judge did not. Jury trials are
1 9
Additionally, the
precious; it is astonishing how few we can afford.
psychiatrist, who
diagnosing
in
the
prosecutors wanted to avoid bringing

118. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.03 (Vernon 1975).
119. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 37, at 62 ("It is no secret that our system of civil justice
has generated a pent-up demand for low-cost litigation ... "); see also infra Part VIII (discussing
reasons for the vanishing trial).
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had already logged several $400 hours, to charge travel time to and from
the courtroom, sit there several hours with the meter running, and spend
fifteen minutes on the witness stand opining orally about what was fully
expressed in the psychiatrist's report. In the view of the county
government, the cost of this use of the psychiatrist was astronomical,
and the practice was roundly discouraged. The parties' natural tendency,
then, was to accept the first twelve potential jurors without any voir dire
examination and to stipulate to the admissibility of the psychiatrist's
report without his being present. Then, both parties would present the
jurors with their agreed request for acquittal.
The reactions of the resulting juries were extraordinary. Many of
them balked at acquitting defendants on this basis, even when urged to
do so by prosecutors. "Why couldn't the psychiatrist be here?" "Okay,
so it may cost some money, even a lot of money, but the psychiatrist
should be here." The jurors were unwilling to accept hearsay from the
psychiatrist. They feared a conspiracy against the public-the acquittal
of a guilty individual whom the prosecutor wanted falsely to exonerate,
with the connivance of the defense lawyer. The jurors had seen evidence
presented on television in such programs as Perry Mason, Matlock and
Boston Legal, and they concluded that this was not the way it was
supposed to be done. The United States Supreme Court said much the
same thing in Old Chief v. United States, 20 in which the Court
recognized the need for "evidentiary depth" on the part of a litigant with
the burden of proof. The jury has expectations, and those expectations
are disappointed in some instances if jurors are provided only indirect
statements.' 12 Some kinds of hearsay evidence violate the jury's sense of
proper epistemology. And so, my first point is that the stifling
paternalism of the hearsay rule may not always be needed because the
jury is at least as capable of evaluating the potential defects in hearsay
evidence as it is in inferring defects in the testimony of a witness. 122 My
experience leads me, in fact, to conclude that jurors will be suspicious of
hearsay in situations when attorneys and courts would accept it. In my
mind, jurors often have a stronger bias against hearsay than lawyers do.
This conclusion leads to a second point: the hearsay rule is actually
a rule of partial admissibility. It admits a great deal of hearsay through
exceptions and exemptions, as well as by defining evidence as nonhearsay even though it is the equivalent of hearsay and carries similar

120. 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997).
121. Id. at 188-90.
122. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
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risks. The results are arbitrary, however, because the exceptions are the
product of historical accident, not of policy. 23 For example, the
exception for an "excited utterance" admits hearsay if it is spoken while
under the stress of an exciting event. 24 The theory is that the required
element of stress reduces the sincerity risk, because a person under stress
does not have the time or presence of mind to make up a false story. In
the first place, we do not know whether this is so, or whether it is true to
some degree only. 25 In the second place, and more importantly, stress
does not guarantee against defects in perceptivity, qualification,
expression, or bias. In fact, the psychology of perception under
conditions of stress points in precisely the opposite direction from this
exception, indicating that hearsay of this kind is distinctly unreliable.
The experiments show that stress results in distorted perception and
reporting-it produces lesser accuracy, not greater. 26 The ironic result
of this exception for excited utterances, however, is that a court would
be much more likely to admit evidence of Leake's son's hearsay
statement if he had made it under stress-if it had been uttered right
after the accident, for example, or in response to a shocking revelation
by the insurance investigator-even though we would then have less
reason to credit the statement, and even though the statement as actually
uttered, which the rules excluded, had greater indicia of truth.
The same criticisms can be made of other exceptions or
exemptions. Dying declarations, for example, have been the subject of
clearly expressed skepticism founded in their asserted lack of value as
evidence. 2 7 So have statements against interest.1 28 And arguments of a
about other rules, ranging from
similar nature could be constructed
1 30
129
admissions to public records.
123. See John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions: Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to
PsychologicalScience, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-4 (2002).
124.

FED. R. EVID. 803(2).

125. See Myers et al., supra note 123, at 4-5.
126. "It has often been demonstrated that performance suffers if individuals are exposed to
stressful conditions." Id. at 6.
127.

JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883),

reprinted in WALTZ & PARK, supra note 82, at 138-39 (stating that the dying declaration rule
functions poorly in India, apparently because of a belief that dying persons have no motive for truth
telling--e.g., they may make deathbed accusations to hurt enemies).
128. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994) (expressing skepticism
about such statements, producing a three-way split of the Court, and leaving no clear way of
resolving serious admissibility issues remaining under the governing rule).
129. This is particularly true of vicarious admissions attributed to business entities, made
without investigation for one purpose, but offered for another. Cf Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber
Co., 28 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940) (admitting a statement by the corporation's manager
that the employee was acting within the scope of employment, made in connection with employee's
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If the general admittance of hearsay encounters further objections
on grounds of jury credulity, we could provide an instruction to the jury
suggesting that hearsay should be viewed with skepticism. We could
even provide a statement of the reasons"':
Ladies and gentlemen, the statement of Declarant X was of a character
that the law regards as "hearsay." It was the repetition of a statement as
evidence of what the statement says, without the speaker present. You
should consider whether this evidence was subject to defects because
the opposing parties were unable to explore Declarant X's ability to
perceive the subject, qualifications for making the statement, accuracy
of expression, adherence to sincerely telling the truth, or bias. With
live witnesses, the law has ways of exploring these matters, including
cross-examination. Different hearsay statements have different
probabilities of stating the truth, and it is up to you to evaluate the
statement of Declarant X with these possible defects in mind.
This kind of instruction seems unnecessary to me, because I believe that
juries are perfectly capable of reaching these conclusions on their own,
or more likely, as aided by the adversary guidance of attorneys in
opening statements and final argument. But if it is thought that jurors
need help in generating skepticism about hearsay, this kind of
instruction-which the opponent of the evidence probably would
emphasize as a matter of strategy in opening statements and final
argument-would supply encouragement of that skepticism.
There are still other alternatives to a blanket exclusion of hearsay.
The judge has authority, under Rule 403-authority that I would retain
in reforming the Rules 13 2-- to exclude particularly weak or unnecessary
hearsay as cumulative, misleading, or confusing. Also, the common law
rule that hearsay is no evidence, invoked for purposes of a directed
verdict (or a judgment as a matter of law, in federal courts) could be
reinstated.1 33 The result would be that the jury hears all of the evidence,
worker's compensation claim, but used to prove a claim by a third party against the corporation, and
overruling the argument that the statement had been made without personal knowledge, presumably
on the basis of representations by the same employee who made the compensation claim).
130. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) contains complex restrictions that eliminate most uses in
criminal cases, although not in civil cases.
131. This instruction would compare favorably in comprehensibility to other kinds of
credibility-related instructions. Cf, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 522, 558-59 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (suggesting, in an appendix, a lengthy and complex model instruction about eyewitness
testimony).
132. See infra Part VII.
133. Cf Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy Co., 23 S.W.3d 372, 380 (Tex. App.
1999) (observing that hearsay statements are not evidence and as such may not be used as the basis
for judgment).
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but a litigant cannot carry the burden of production without non-hearsay
evidence. This rule would reverse the result in Sir Walter Raleigh's
case. 134 Yet another means of dealing with the asserted problem is to
require the proponent of the evidence to produce a live witness who can
be cross-examined about the making, meaning, and context of the
questioned statement, without requiring that this witness be the person
who uttered the statement.
This last proposal-requiring a live witness who can be crossexamined by the opponent, and who can put the statement in context-is
a potentially powerful response to the criticisms of hearsay. Through
such a witness, even if he or she is someone other than the declarant, the
asserted defects of any item of hearsay evidence could be explored in
front of the jury. An amended rule might say, then, that "hearsay is
admissible if authenticated by a sponsoring witness who knows of the
circumstances of its utterance and who is subject to cross-examination
about the evidentiary risks it may involve." In fact, the opponent may be
able in many cases to cross-examine this witness more effectively than
she would a declarant who was present. In Leake v. Hagert,135 for
example, the witness presumably would be the insurance investigator
who reported having heard the statement:
Attorney: You don't know, Mr. Adjuster, whether Leake's son saw the
light recently, or whether he only saw it years before the
accident?
Witness: No, I don't.
Attorney: You don't know whether he ever saw it, do you?
Witness: No.
Attorney: You don't know whether he was telling the truth, do you?
Witness: I have no way of knowing.
Attorney: You don't know what he meant by the phrase, 'out for some
time,' do you? For example, mightn't he have meant that
part of the lens was out, or that it earlier had been out but
was repaired at the time?
Witness: I don't know, of course. For all I know, his father had fixed
it by the time of the accident.
Attorney: And in fact, a lot of kids these days dislike their parents and
find ways to get back at them. You don't know whether
Leake's son fits in that group, do you?
Witness: For all I know, he may have hated his father.

134. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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Cross-examining a witness who knows the context of the statement,
even if the witness is not the declarant, is relatively easy and can be
entirely effective in getting the point across to the jury.
In fact, prosecutors and defense lawyers in my jurisdiction
ultimately used this solution to address their agreed-insanity problem,
which I have previously described. The defense attorney could call
himself as a witness: "My client is unable to separate reality from
delusion. He tells elaborate stories about his 'children,' but I have
learned that he has no children." The defense lawyer then would mark
the psychiatrist's report as Defense Exhibit 1, have it received by
stipulation, and explain its contents. The prosecutor then would crossexamine the defense lawyer about the psychiatrist's report. If courts took
this approach, the result would be, as I believe was the case in my
jurisdiction, juries who understand the evidence and who do not have
concerns about being fooled.
And lest I be misunderstood, I have no doubt that, even if the
process were adversary-if the defense lawyer sought acquittal on
insanity grounds but the prosecution opposed it-the prosecutor would
have been entirely effective at cross-examining a substitute expert about
the psychiatrist's report, just as the defense lawyer would have been
effective at cross-examining a substitute about an opposing expert's
report. The question is academic because, in an adversary situation, both
would likely choose to present their experts live, for reasons of jury
persuasion. 36 The point, however, is that effective cross-examination
can be supplied in many cases by the presence of a witness other than
the declarant, and in most such cases, the cross will actually be more
effective rather than less so. The concern for cross-examination, in other
words, does not justify a blanket exclusion of hearsay.
D. CriminalCases: The Right of Confrontation
Criminal cases present certain additional issues. One of the most
significant is the Confrontation Clause. After Crawford v.
Washington,1 37 the effect of the Clause, as interpreted, is to exclude
hearsay that is "testimonial" in character, unless the declarant is
unavailable and has been cross-examined. I see the Crawford decision as
dubious on its merits because I do not agree with the Court's single136. See infra Part VIII.C (explaining forensic strategies favoring live witnesses); see also
supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (reporting the Supreme Court's expression of the same
theory).
137. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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focus rationale depending upon the historical distinction between
testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay.' 38 I believe instead that
reliability, the consideration upon which prior cases had been based but
that the Court rejected, 139 also was an important historical factor, 140 and I

do not think the Court dealt consistently with counterexamples such as
dying declarations, statements against interest, and admissions, which
14 1
admit testimonial hearsay because of reliability-related factors.
Furthermore, I see the Court's own declarations of factors supporting
stare decisis142 as supporting retention of the existing line of cases, from
which the Court in Crawford abruptly departed. 43 But that issue,
concerning whether Washington v. Crawford was incorrectly decided,
would require another article by itself, and here, I shall take the
Crawford decision as correct. The Constitution limits both our Rules of
Evidence and our repeal of them, and whatever happens to the hearsay
rule, it is necessary for trial evidence to conform to the Supreme Court's
requirements. In other words, because of Crawford, rightly or wrongly,
any modification of the hearsay rule must still result in the exclusion of
138. See id. at 43-56.
139. Crawford overruled a line of cases that emphasized reliability, including Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
140. The Court relied heavily in its recounting of history upon Sir Walter Raleigh's case as
supporting its testimonial/non-testimonial distinction. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44, 51-52 & n.3
(relying "especially" on that case). The trouble with this reliance, however, is that Raleigh
emphatically argued lack of reliability, the very rationale that the Crawford Court rejected. See
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
141. The Court described dying declarations as "[t]he one deviation we have found" and as
"sui generis," and it relegated this observation to a footnote. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. Just
as persuasively, however, the dying declaration exception could be offered as a clear
counterexample to the Court's conclusion, showing that reliability is, indeed, an important rationale
for admitting testimonial hearsay. Furthermore, the Court's reference to this "one deviation" shows
that its search was inadequate. Statements against interest have long been admissible on reliability
grounds even if testimonial, as is shown by Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994).
This case was another example concerning admissions, which were exceptions to the hearsay rule at
common law even if testimonial in nature, on grounds involving reliability. See id. at 605 (citing
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543-45 (1986)).
142. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (articulating factors
favoring stare decisis); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (making a similar
articulation with regard to stare decisis).
143. The Court in Crawford made no effort to justify its departure from Roberts by reference to
the factors in Casey and Payne, but decided to abandon stare decisis because Roberts's
"unpardonable vice" was that it admitted evidence that the Founders "plainly meant to exclude." See
541 U.S. at 63. In other words, the departure from stare decisis was based on disagreement about
this issue, not on factors that excuse compliance with stare decisis. The Court referred to confusion
created by the reliability standard in Roberts, id. at 62-63, but it did not and could not predict that its
new standard would reduce that confusion. See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay:
Exemptions from the Constitutional UnavailabilityRequirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665, 668-70
(1986) (noting that courts have had difficulty applying the Roberts test).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:585

testimonial hearsay from criminal trials if the declarant is not truly
unavailable or was not cross examined.
But this limitation, though it must be strictly observed, does not
mandate the exclusion of any other kind of hearsay. In particular, civil
trials are not affected by the Confrontation Clause, and neither are issues
in criminal cases where the Clause does not require exclusion.
Therefore, these constitutional considerations furnish no reason, for
example, for the exclusion of the good evidence that resulted in Leake v.
Hagert.144 And for reasons that I will develop later in this Article, 145 as
long as the Compulsory Process Clause is meaningful, the natural
strategies of the opposing parties furnish a counteractant to hearsay risks
in criminal cases as well. In summary, I believe that, even in criminal
cases, the jury's ability to evaluate hearsay risks, the interest of
adversary counsel in pointing them out, jury instructions describing
hearsay and encouraging suspicion, rules requiring non-hearsay evidence
for sufficiency purposes, and the natural strategies of counsel that I shall
describe in Part VIII, would provide powerful tools to limit concerns
about hearsay, so that a blanket rule excluding constitutionally
admissible hearsay results in an excess of disadvantages over
advantages.
E. Selective Retrenchment of the HearsayRule
So far, the arguments that I have made would support the complete
elimination of the hearsay rule, except to the extent that exclusion is
required by the Confrontation Clause. I believe that outcome might well
be preferable to the regime we have now, in which the rule excludes
good evidence along with bad, on the basis of considerations that
frequently have little to do with the difference. 146 This belief is
strengthened by the availability of alternate protections against the
147
hearsay risks, as well as by the weakness of the existing protections.
In particular, outside the purview of the Confrontation Clause, concerns
about demeanor, the oath, and eye-to-eye presence seem unlikely to
exclude bad evidence any more than they exclude good evidence, and
unfortunately, the jury's ability to detect falsehood in witnesses, even
144.

See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.

145.

See infra Part VIII.C.

146. See, e.g., supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (examining instances in which rules
produce admissibility results that are arguably inconsistent with policy).
147. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.").
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after cross-examination, is likely to prove
no better than its ability to
48
perceive the risks inherent in hearsay.1
Nevertheless, cross-examination provides a rationale for retention
of the hearsay rule in some cases. This rationale is partially undercut
when the witness is available to the opposing party, who can use
compulsory process to exercise the right to cross-examine unless doing
so is unreasonably difficult.149 But there could be cases of spoliation and
of arranged hearsay: a party with a motive to do so might cause a
witness to create oral or written hearsay deliberately for use at trial and
then procure the absence of that witness. In a later section, I shall
develop reasons why this practice is likely to be unusual, but the
possibility exists.1 50 Then, too, retention of the hearsay rule is supported
by its entrenched position in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Its
complete abolition is a political impossibility. But the reasons for
retention of this exclusionary principle do not furnish an argument
against cutting it back selectively. What, then, are some partial reforms,
short of abolishing the hearsay rule, that might limit its effect in
excluding good evidence?
First, as a small step, consider unavailability. Other than as
mandated by the Confrontation Clause, unavailability of the witness
should be abolished as a requirement for any hearsay exception. This
Article has already examined the negative effects that the unavailability
requirement imposes, particularly in small cases in which hearsay
exceptions could furnish important, reliable information.' 5' The former
testimony exception, for example, admits evidence that has been
subjected to the oath and to cross-examination, and usually to eye-to-eye
confrontation as well; accordingly, proof of unavailability, which may
drive up expenses inordinately, should not be required. 52 Furthermore,

148. See supra Part III.B.
149. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
150. See infra Part VIII.C.
151.

See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.

152. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (asserting that "where proffered hearsay has
sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the
Confrontation Clause is satisfied"); Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40
Hous. L. REV. 1003, 1053-54 (2003) (interpreting White as standing for the proposition that
"because an unavailability requirement for out-of-court statements other than former testimony is
not likely to produce testimony that adds meaningfully to the truth-determining process, the burdens
on the prosecution of requiring proof of unavailability (other than as a prerequisite for the admission
of former testimony) far outweigh any benefit of doing so"). Rule 804(b)(1) requires not only
unavailability, but also the oath and cross-examination. It also requires a "proceeding" or
deposition, at which the opponent usually will have the opportunity to be present. FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(1).
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if the opponent wants live testimony from the witness, the opponent can
produce the witness if the witness is available; 53 the opponent's failure
to do so, coupled with dog-in-the-manger arguments for exclusion, is the
best indicator that either unavailability exists or that the opponent does
not really want the witness. Other exceptions requiring unavailability do
not mirror the protections against hearsay risks so completely, but they
do admit the possibility that the opponent could call an available witness
if desired rather than seek exclusion altogether, and they are based upon
considerations having to do with the trustworthiness and reliability of the
for
requirement
the unavailability
evidence. 154 Eliminating
nontestimonial evidence and in civil trials, therefore, would minimize
both the additional admission of bad evidence and the exclusion of good
evidence-which ought to be the objective.
Second, for similar reasons, the civil case exclusion of deposition
evidence without unavailability should be reversed. 55 This, too, is a
modest step. A deposition supplies the most important protections
against hearsay risks--oath and cross-examination-it makes likely the
existence of eye-to-eye confrontation, since the opposing party often is
present, and it even supplies demeanor evidence if the deposition has
been videotaped. 56 If the opponent wants the presence of an available
witness, the opponent can supply it, and again, the opponent's efforts at
exclusion, without producing the witness itself, is a strong indicator that
obtaining the witness live is impractical or that the opponent's strategy is
better served by foregoing the protections against hearsay risks. As was
previously demonstrated by the discussion about Frechette v. Welch, the
costs and unpredictability created by the exclusionary principle are
significant. The Federal Rules should be revised to admit depositions
without consideration of unavailability.
Third, the residual exception to the hearsay rule' should be
broadened. In particular, the requirement that the proponent show that
the evidence in question is better than any other reasonably available

153. See infra Part VIII.C.
154. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2)-(4) (creating exceptions for statements under belief of
impending death, statements against interest, and statements of personal or family history). See also
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) ("[fiorfeiture by wrongdoing" is based upon separate policies, but may also
reflect concerns about trustworthiness and necessity).
155. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text. The exclusion of deposition evidence
where the witness is available is mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32, which is actually
the equivalent to a rule of evidence.
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 28-32.
157. FED. R. EVID. 807.
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evidence should be removed. 158 The existence of other, available
evidence does not measure the value of the excluded information,
because the particular piece of evidence may dovetail with other
evidence in the case to produce a preponderance that otherwise would be
absent. In other words, the persuasiveness of the evidence may be
significant even if there is other evidence on point; it may tip the scale.
The rule, as thus amended, would admit hearsay that has particularized
guarantees of reliability, 15 9 the admittance of which is consistent with the
policies of the rules and the interests of justice. 160 The use of the nobetter-evidence factor in addition to these requirements, to exclude tipthe-scales evidence merely because there is other evidence of the fact at
issue, disserves the search for truth to no sound purpose. In Leake v.
Hagert, for example, the important evidence furnished by the son's
definitive statenent against his father's case probably would be
excluded under the current residual exception, simply because Hagert
was present and an eyewitness to the events. 16' The proposed elimination
of the no-better-evidence criterion would make the son's statement
admissible to tip the scales, precisely because it is good evidence that
cannot be supplied otherwise as a practical matter. It would even defeat
the possibility of spoliation by the father, in the form of possible
procurement of the unavailability of the witness. 162 This reconfiguration
of the residual exception would go far to remedy injustices created by
witness unavailability, while doing little violence to the purposes of the
rules of evidence. An expanded residual exception would not operate in
criminal cases, under the assumptions of this Article, if the witness was
available or the evidence testimonial; it could, however, operate soundly
in civil cases and in criminal cases in which there is a trustworthy, nontestimonial statement from an unavailable witness.
Fourth, the current regime could be replaced by the original House
of Representatives version of the hearsay rule. That version, as
aforementioned, would have admitted hearsay evidence that was
trustworthy and reliable, with the existing hearsay exceptions listed as

158. The current Rule requires that the evidence be shown to be "more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the opponent can procure through reasonable
efforts." FED. R. EVID. 807(B). This requirement can exclude highly reliable evidence that would tip
the scales.
159.

FED. R. EVID. 807 (requiring "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness").

160.
161.
162.

FED. R. EvID. 807(C).
See Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675, 683 (N.D. 1970).
See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text for discussion of this possibility.
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nonexclusive examples. 163 The result would be tantamount to an
exception admitting hearsay on the basis of two criteria: necessity and
trustworthiness. The courts presumably would create new categories of
recognizably admissible evidence, much in the manner of common law
evolution. This kind of evidence could not be admitted in criminal cases
if it were testimonial or if the declarant were available, but it would
build flexibility that would help to reverse the exclusion of good
evidence that now is mandated categorically by the hearsay rule. In
Leake v. Hagert, for example, this non-categorical, trustworthiness-andnecessity approach would provide for admissibility of the son's evidence
in a systematic way, without the strictures of the residual exception.
I would go further with these changes, myself. In particular, I
would prefer to see principles allowing the admittance of evidence
regardless of the hearsay doctrine under circumstances'in which the jury
can soundly evaluate the supposed risks of hearsay. 164 This approach,
similarly, would invite the courts to create a kind of common law of
broader admissibility than exists today. In addition to requiring
consideration of the jury's ability to evaluate the risks in and of itself, I
would condition admissibility upon an instruction of the kind sketched
above, 165 upon the ability of counsel to explain the risks in opening
statement and argument, upon the unlikelihood of spoliation by
deliberate creation of the evidence coupled with procurement of
unavailability, 166 and upon production of a witness able to testify about
the circumstances of the statement and about the possibility that the
hearsay risks taint the statement. 167 I believe that the strategies of
counsel, the relative abilities of juries to evaluate statements and live
testimony, and the need for less technical rules of exclusion, all support
163. See Hearing on H.R. 5463, supra note 23, at 270-75 (discussing the testimony of Paul F.
Rothstein, Professor, Georgetown University).
164. For my analysis of the role of hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, see the discussion
supra Part III.C. My proposal is bolstered by studies that have suggested that "jurors are more
skeptical of hearsay testimony than eyewitness testimony" and that jurors may actually "indicate[]
more sensitivity to the varying quality and accuracy of testimony from hearsay witnesses than
eyewitnesses." Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1992); Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research
Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in

American Courts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 65, 76 (1991) ("In our experiment
hearsay ... appeared to exert minimal influence on the ultimate outcome of the trial."); Peter Miene
et al., JurorDecision Making and the Evaluation ofHearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 683, 699
(1992) (concluding that the "the data from this study suggests that hearsay as a form of testimony is
not overvalued by jurors").
165. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
166. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 91-101, 135 and accompanying text.
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this approach;' 68 however, I recognize that, unlike the smaller steps
sketched above, it has little chance of immediate acceptance.
IV.

REPETITIVE-BEHAVIOR

169

EVIDENCE: SHOULD SIMILAR EPISODES

OF MISCONDUCT BE ADMISSIBLE?
Success in navigating everyday challenges requires us to make
judgments about the actions of other individuals from their repetitive
behaviors. A law professor knows that a certain student is likely to be
ready to answer questions, while another is not. She knows whether her
husband is thoughtful, or not, and whether her dean is a willing
fundraiser, or not. People are probably as skilled at making these kinds
of judgments as they are about evidentiary matters that routinely are
admitted in lawsuits-for example, does flight provide evidence of
guilt? 170 Furthermore, some of those routinely admitted kinds of
as severe as or more severe than, repetitiveevidence involve prejudice
71
evidence.1
behavior
Of course, inductive reasoning, which is how we make these
judgments about repetitive behavior, is fallible. Bertrand Russell tells the
sad story of a chicken who runs each day to greet the farmer, who feeds
the chicken, but one day, the farmer wrings the chicken's neck, which,
after all, is the purpose of chickens. Russell's blunt conclusion is that it
would be better for the chicken if its inductive processes were "less
crude."' 172 As human beings, we must develop the ability to make both
reasonably accurate conclusions that we can draw from induction about
other human beings and a sense of the limits or fallacies inherent in that
168. See infra Part VIII.C.
169. This kind of evidence often is referred to, vaguely, as "character" evidence. It is very
different, however, from the kind of evidence provided by general "character witnesses," which is
treated by the rules as dubious and therefore generally excluded, although tolerable in narrow
instances. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 1view concrete instances of repetitive behavior as presenting a
distinct problem, and therefore, rather than the pejorative label of "character" evidence, I prefer the
term "repetitive behavior" evidence.
170. Flight often involves the commission of separate crimes that create a greater balance of
prejudice over probativity because they do not support even an inference of repetitive conduct, and
they may involve violence. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 944-45 (E.D.N.Y.
1975). The inference is composed of a chain of sub-inferences about human behavior, each link of
which is debatable.
171. Compare id. at 943-45 (announcing a complex and debatable discretionary ruling that
admitted flight and falsehood evidence but eliminated arguable high-probativity facts because of
concerns about asserted prejudice), with United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 322-23 (8th Cir.
1978) (upholding the admittance of flight evidence that included multiple crimes of violence,
multiple weapons crimes, and "traveling arsenals linked by communication devices and code
words").
172. See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON, supra note 21, § 1.02, at 8-9.
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reasoning. A person may be surprised to see his friend John, who
"always is late," arrive right on time, explaining that "I've made a New
Year's resolution to be punctual." The fact is, we make attribution
173
errors, as the psychologists would label them, about human behavior.
We may also be uneducated about those situations in which past
behavior is a guide to the future and those in which it is not, but is
merely situational.174 There is no reason to conclude, however, that we
are not as good with these kinds of judgments about human behavior as
we are about many other kinds of information that would be allowed
freely into evidence in a trial. 75 Furthermore, the inference that persons
who have engaged in particular kinds of highly improper behavior in the
past are likely as a group to correlate with those who will engage in
similar kinds of behavior in the future, is a better inference than those
76
inferences that psychologists find to be subject most often to error.
In other words, evidence of repetition of behavior, or propensity,
can be good evidence. People who commit armed robberies on particular
occasions are more likely to commit them on other occasions. For other
kinds of crimes, such as child molestation or heroin possession, the
77
inference of repetition is even stronger; in fact, it is powerful.
173. Id. § 11.06, at 379-80. This is an insidious error, and the general prohibition on vague
character-witness evidence (although not the prohibition on repetitive-conduct evidence) arguably
can be justified by it. The "fundamental attribution error," strikingly illustrated in the NapolitanGoethals experiment, is the excessive attribution of friendliness or aloofness to "dispositional"
factors (the actor) rather than "situational" factors (transitory events). Id. A rude and abrupt
colleague, in other words, may exhibit this behavior because she is tired or in a hurry, but we tend to
attribute it to her personality. This kind of attribution experiment shows little, however, about
whether we are justified in inferring that a repetitive burglar is less or more likely to be guilty of a
burglary proved by additional evidence.
174. Cf David P. Leonard, The Use of Characterto Prove Conduct: Rationalityand Catharsis
in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,25-28, 60 (1986-87) (proposing admittance of
specific-acts evidence by defendants and including analysis of psychological literature showing
conditions under which it is persuasive, including repetitive behavior with respect to the violation or
non-violation of societal norms); David Crump, How Should We Treat CharacterEvidence Offered
to Prove Conduct?, 58 U. COLO.L. REV. 279, 283 (1987) (responding to Leonard).
175. See, e.g., Joe S.Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessonsfrom Civil
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 728-29 (1991) (asserting the overall competence of civil juries,
even in technical and complicated matters).
176. As an example of an inference about a group that might be considered reasonable, many
state legislatures determined that sex offenders, as a group, are more likely to be repeat offenders
than other types of criminals. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-20.1 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12902 (Michie 2004); IDAHO CODE § 18-8302 (Michie 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4002 (2004).
177. See Jennifer B. Siverts, Note & Comment, Punishing Thoughts Too Close to Reality: A
New Solution to Protect Childrenfrom Pedophiles, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 393, 395 (2005)
(quoting recidivism rates as high as ninety-five percent); Sana Loue, The Criminalization of the
Addictions: Toward a Unified Approach, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 281, 316 (2003) (explaining the high
rate of crime repetition for crimes involving dependency-inducing drugs).
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Evidence of commission of a particular kind of crime on one occasion
does not furnish proof beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of
another particular crime by itself, but then neither does flight. If we truly
needed to hide the facts from jurors to prevent erroneous inferences from
this kind of information, then I would argue that we would be forced to
conclude that our entire jury trial system would be suspect: too
unreliable to trust.
The existing general rule about repetitive behavior evidence begins
with the proposition that evidence of similar crimes is inadmissible to
prove propensity. 17 8 There are said to be several reasons. First, the
defendant, it is asserted, should be held responsible only for the offense
of indictment; second, the jury should not have the opportunity to
overvalue the inference to be drawn from other offenses; and third,
179
None of these
similar-crimes evidence can create unfair surprise.
arguments, however, is persuasive. It is extremely unlikely that very
many juries, after repeatedly being told the opposite during voir dire,
opening statement, jury instructions, and final argument, will believe
that they lawfully can simply substitute another crime that is not in the
indictment for the charges before them. 80 As for the second rationale, it
is entirely plausible that a jury could overvalue evidence of similar
crimes, but no more so than it could overvalue any other kind of
from DNA to eyewitness
obviously admissible evidence,
181
If we excluded everything a jury might overvalue,
identification.
nothing would be left. In fact, the distinctness of other-crimes

178. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (excluding evidence offered to prove "action in conformity").
179. See, e.g., United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 906-08 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding similar
crimes evidence admissible where the evidence was relevant to intent and the probative value of the
evidence outweighed any prejudice to the defendant).
180. The trial of entertainer Michael Jackson is a forceful example of the jury's ability. It
involved proof of several other crimes involving sexual improprieties with children, some of them
involving disgusting facts, but the primary charge was vulnerable to witness impeachment, and the
jury acquitted him of this single charge although the evidence supported a strong inference that he
must have been guilty of some crime or crimes. See Tim Molloy, Jurors Speak out About Their
Verdict in Jackson Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS ST. & LOC. WIRE, June 14, 2005, at State & Regional;

Andrew Vachss, Op-Ed., Unsafe at Any Age, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at A23; Paul Farhi, Firm
in Its Conviction There Was Too Much Doubt, WASH. POST, June 14, 2005, at Al (reporting the
verdict in the Jackson trial); Libby Copeland, Man Testifies Jackson Fondled Him as a Young Boy,
WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at CI (describing the testimony of a man who claimed Jackson molested
him as a boy); Libby Copeland, Son Slept With Jackson, Mother in Old Case Says, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 2005, at CI (recounting testimony from a mother who claims Jackson inappropriately slept
with her son).
181.

Cf DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING

STRATEGIES §§ 4.05-.06, at 223-33 (2005) (exploring the force and fallacies of these kinds of
evidence).
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evidence-the obviousness of the proposition that evidence about a
totally separate event does not allow conviction by mere deductive
processes-makes other-crimes evidence far less subject to
overvaluation than eyewitness or DNA evidence. Those are more direct
proofs of guilt, with lesser chains of inference and with their defects
often hidden.1 82 Other-crimes evidence, by way of contrast, is (by
definition) about crimes distinct from the one on trial, a fact that is
unlikely to be lost to any juror. Finally, the proposition that other-crimes
evidence will result in unfair surprise is singularly unpersuasive. Even if
notice rules were not in place, I would venture to say that virtually one
hundred percent of the time, the defense is aware of allegations of other
similar crimes that are known to the prosecution. Actually, however, this
rationale is unnecessary because notice requirements in the Federal
Rules 183 effectively negate the surprise theory.
But this is not all of the character-evidence rule. Our principles
suffer from multiple-personality disorder, because the rule goes on to
provide that evidence of other, similar crimes is not excluded for the
purpose of demonstrating intent, identity, or other non-propensity
purposes. 184 The result is that other crimes are excluded if they are
similar-but not if they are closely similar! The prosecution, then,
approaches the trial with a chart of similarities: the robber in another
crime, who is identified as this defendant, used a gun, threats, and a
mask similar to the ones in this trial. The defense prepares a chart to the
opposite effect, emphasizing the differences: the witnesses' descriptions
of height, escape vehicles, and clothing of the persons in the two
robberies were different.'8 5 The judge then has the task of deciding
whether the differences are such that the main thrust of the evidence is
propensity or whether the similarities support inferences of intent or
86
identity that are not overwhelmed by the differences.1
The trouble is, this abstraction may interfere with sound reasoning
about guilt or innocence. In the first place, the distinction between
"propensity" and "intent or identity" as the object of proof here is
unclear; in fact, it is a metaphysical conundrum. 187 Inferences of intent
182. See id.
183.
184.

See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

185. Cf. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (reproducing exactly
such data, in chart form).
186. This balancing is required by Rule 403. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
685-86 (1988).
187. Cf ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, § 8.05, at 345 (posing a problem regarding the
Munchausen-by-proxy syndrome in which a parent is motivated to injure her child repeatedly, in
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or identity, in such a case, are founded on inferences about propensity to
commit similar acts. Inferences of intent or identity are inferences about
propensity. In the second place, and more importantly, the admissibility
judgment required of the court is so imprecise that it necessarily will be
determined more by the judge's idiosyncratic preferences than by the
underlying rules. Decisions about how strong the intent-identity
inference is, how strong the propensity inference is (to the extent it is
even possible to separate propensity from intent or identity), and
whether the latter substantially outweighs the former, 88 are so
indeterminate that the elaborate decision structure mandated by the rules
hardly controls them.
And then, there are Rules 413 through 415. In sexual assault cases,
similar crimes are more readily admissible, even if they are not precisely
similar. A defendant accused of rape or of sexual abuse of a child cannot
use the usual exclusionary principle of Rule 404(b) to prevent the jury
from hearing evidence that he committed another crime of rape or sexual
abuse.' 89 The ironic result is illustrated by considering the trials of a
robbery case in courtroom A and a rape case in courtroom B, next door.
For each defendant, let us imagine, there is evidence of the commission
of six other crimes of similar nature, although not similar enough to
support sufficient inferences of intent or identity. The robbery case in
courtroom A will feature evidence only of the single robbery in the
indictment. All evidence about similar conduct by the defendant will be
suppressed in courtroom A. But in courtroom B, the evidence will not be
so confined. The jury will hear about the crime on trial in courtroom B,
and also, entirely differently from the jury in courtroom A, the jury in
courtroom B will freely hear evidence of the six other rapes.
The difference in these sexual assault rules is sometimes traced to
the so-called "lustful disposition theory": the inference that, when there
is evidence of multiple rapes, one can detect evidence of a motive, or a
lustful disposition, which assertedly is distinct from propensity. There
are common law cases to this effect.' 90 The theory arguably has appeal
to the extent that repeated crimes of any kind can be said to reveal a
motive, but labeling such a "motive" as "lust" hardly distinguishes it
from "propensity." One might just as accurately say that repeated drug
order to gain sympathy for later caring for the child, while also suggesting that "propensity" and
"motive" are inseparable, although the latter admits the evidence while the former excludes it).
188. See, e.g., id.
189.

FED. R. EVID. 413-415.

190. See Hodge v. United States, 126 F.2d 849, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1942). For a case rejecting this
theory but discussing both sides, see Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335-39 (Ind. 1992).
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possession offenses show a motive of drug dependency (in fact, that
seems a better inference), or that serial murderers or repeat robbers
exhibit a "disposition" toward their respective crimes. A slightly better
argument for the different treatment of sexual assaults, but one that still
does not support the conclusion, is that rape is a particularly malignant
and grossly under-reported crime. Yes, it is malignant and underreported, but there are other under-reported and malignant crimes that do
not feature this evidentiary approach. Finally, there is another
explanation: the lobbying efforts of feminists, who particularly targeted
rape, coincided with the inclinations of a Senate Judiciary Committee
that favored broad admissibility of evidence in criminal cases. In other
words, the difference between the usual character rules and Rules 413
through 415 is the product of political forces. 19 1
Fine, a critic of the sexual-assault rules might say, the solution is to
repeal the rules that admit other-rape evidence. Then, if we exclude
repetitive behavior evidence in all cases, the critic would argue, the
anomaly disappears. Yes, it does, but one should question whether the
resulting regime would be more productive of justice. Consider two
high-profile rape cases from real life, one brought against William
Kennedy Smith, the well-financed nephew of President John F. and
Senator Ted Kennedy,' 92 and the other brought against sports announcer
Marv Albert. 193 The two cases were strikingly similar, down to the
existence of evidence of at least two parallel rapes committed by each
defendant, each with significant similarities to the offenses on trial. Each
was defended by Roy Black, a skillful and nationally known Florida
lawyer. Smith was tried in Florida, which features particularly strict
exclusion of similar-crimes evidence in rape cases as well as other trials.
Some of the Florida precedents would be amusing if not so grimly
serious: in one case, for example, Florida mandated exclusion of a crime
of violence similar to the one on trial with the observation that the
victims' hands had been tied behind their backs in both cases, but not

191. See R. Wade King, Comment, FederalRules of Evidence 413 and 414: By Answering the
Public's CallforIncreased Protectionfrom Sexual Predators,Did Congress Move Too Far Toward
Encouraging Conviction Based on Character Rather than Guilt?, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1167,

1169 (2002).
192. See Mark Hansen, Experts Expected Smith Verdict: Even a Perfect ProsecutorCan Lose
Date Rape Cases, Pundits Say, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 18; David Margolick, Why Jury in Smith
Case Never Heardfrom 3 Other Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, atB14.
193. John Leo, The Recycling of Reputations, 135 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Oct. 20, 2003, at
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with the same implements. 194 The trial court in Smith's case excluded all
evidence of the other offenses committed by Smith, even though they
featured very similar modus operandi. He was acquitted. 195 Albert, on
the other hand, faced trial in the District of Columbia, where the Federal
Rules allowed similar-crimes evidence in rape cases. The admissibility
of two other offenses, which featured behavior-in biting the victimsin the case in chief, persuaded Black and Albert to offer a
similar to that 196
guilty.
of
plea
I would argue that it is poor epistemology to isolate the one victim
of William Kennedy Smith over which Florida had jurisdiction, to force
the jury to consider her evidence alone, and to suppress the evidence of
two other independent reporters who were victims of a similar modus
operandi. I would like to see cases of this kind handled as Marv Albert's
was. There would be objections who would vaguely assert, "That's not
fair," by which they would mean that it is not proper to deprive the
defendant of the defense of consent by disproving it with what a jury
may regard as strong evidence of his guilt, but that custom has not
credited. I do not accept this objection, and I would support admitting all
of the evidence that is relevant, as this other-acts evidence is. If strong
evidence of guilt, as seen from a juror's position, is available, it should
be shared with the jury. The jury would be required to find the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, of course, and it would be
repeatedly told that it must find guilt, if at all, with respect to the crime
charged in the indictment.197 But the jury would be playing with a full
deck, with all of the relevant information, and not with a major fact
suppressed, one that any sane person would consider important. And
evidence of a similar
furthermore, I can see no justification for excluding
198
kind in a robbery, drug sale, or murder case.
One recent phenomenon that all lawyers should fear is the
unwillingness of citizens to serve on juries, 99 an unwillingness that
194. Drake v. State, 400 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1981). Florida's Williams rule excluded
repetitive-conduct evidence unless the similarities were highly particularized, like a signature.
Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla. 1959).
195. See authorities cited supra note 192.
196. See Gary Mihoces, Albert Possibly Not Done Yet with Legal Battles, USA TODAY, Oct.
27, 1997, at 3C.
197. See CRUMP & MERTENS, supra note 30, at 79, 85, 108-09, 111-12, 115 (reflecting
instructions from both the prosecutor and defense during voir dire to this effect, jury argument by
defense referring to explicit instructions by the court, and the court's own instructions).
198. There is, in fact, wide agreement among scholars that recidivism data supports making the
repetitive-behavior inference more strongly in other kinds of cases than those involving sexual
assaults. See authorities cited infra note 203.
199. Cf Crump, Irrelevant Evidence, supranote 32, at 39-42 (giving examples).
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probably proceeds, at least in part, from many citizens' concerns that the
truth will be hidden from them by irrational rules. Jurors hate to be
fooled, and when it comes to character evidence, citizens are right to feel
this concern. The character evidence rules exclude evidence that
ordinary people would recognize immediately as meaningful, even as
they would recognize that the evidence is not alone determinative, and
that it does not address the issue directly-it is circumstantial only. Rule
404(b), the principal repetitive-behavior rule, should be revised along
the lines of Rules 413 through 415. As is true in the case of those rules,
evidence of significantly dissimilar crimes should be excluded on the
basis of the Rule 403 calculus.20 0 In other words, evidence of a
completely different kind of crime should be excluded on the ground
that the prejudice it creates in the form of general dislike of the
defendant substantially outweighs the probative value inherent in the
inference of repetitive conduct. Likewise, diffuse character attacks, of
the kind that sometimes have been reported in the judge-only trials of
civil law countries, 20 1 would be prohibited by application of Rule 403,
and defensive character witnesses offering general good-character
evidence should continue to be governed by Rule 405.202 But inferences
of repetitive conduct founded on offenses similar in kind and rare in the
general population are sufficiently within the competence of juries to
support admissibility of this evidence. As Professor Park puts it
(although I have no reason to believe that he supports the proposal I am
making here):
[A]n assessment of the probative value of other-crime character
evidence requires a comparison of the criminal propensity of prior

offenders with the criminal propensity of other persons [as well as
consideration of recidivism data].... When a given crime has a low
incidence in the general population, the probative value of evidence of
another instance of the same crime will be greater than would have
been the case had the crime been more common .... 203

200.

United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D.N.M. 1997) (holding that Rule 403

applies to evidence admissible under Rules 413-415 and can exclude it).
201.

See ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER, reprintedin WALTZ & PARK, supra note 82 at 396-

97 (suggesting that defendant's alleged lack of visible emotion at his mother's funeral would be
admissible as character evidence in a prosecution for an unrelated alleged murder of a third person).
Rule 403 excludes such evidence in American criminal trials.
202. FED. R. EvID. 405 (allowing reputation or opinion evidence).
203.

Roger C. Park, Characterat the Crossroads,49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 759-60 (1998). For

other views of this issue, see Edward J. lmwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the
American CharacterEvidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the
Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 287 (1995) (suggesting, contrary to Park, that high-
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The current Rules, which hide this kind of sensible inference from those
it conscripts as decisionmakers, are unfair to citizens who serve as jurors
as well as to the cause of justice.
V.

EXPERTS AND OPINION EVIDENCE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
UNSATISFACTORY JURISPRUDENCE

Next, let us consider rules that exclude expert opinion. The
Supreme Court has left the law of expert witnesses hopelessly confused.
I have written about the subject elsewhere, and there is no reason to
repeat everything said there, as opposed to referring the reader to that
article.2 °4 A brief synopsis, I hope, will be enough. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,205 our most egocentric Justice, Justice
206
ignored the dissenting advice of Chief Justice
Blackmun,
20 7 who argued that the Court had insufficiently grasped the
Rehnquist,
problem to provide a definitive test for science. Justice Blackmun went
on to attempt just that, by providing a confused version of the
20 8 There are other
philosophy of science of Sir Robert Popper.

recidivism crimes are more appropriate candidates for treatment by admitting repetitive-behavior
evidence); Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law,
110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 578-79 (1997) (making the same point about sexual assaults but generally
opposing the evidence).
204. David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's
Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Crump, Trouble with Daubert]. For
commentary on this article, see Edward J. lmwinkelried, Peer Dialogue, The How and What of
"Appropriate Validation" under Daubert: Reconsidering the Treatment of Einstein & Freud, 68
Mo. L. REV. 43 (2003); Paul R. Rice, Peer Dialogue, The Quagmireof Scientific Expert Testimony:
Crumping the Supreme Court'sStyle, 68 Mo. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (2003).
205. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
206. For sheer self-absorption, Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Planned Parenthoodv.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922-43 (1992), has to be read to be believed. After comparing his own
opinions to a "flickering candle" that "has grown bright" because of the concurrence of other judges
in that belief in this particular case, and after expressing his "fear for the darkness" represented by
the beliefs of the other four Justices who disagreed with him, Justice Blackmun added, "I am 83
years old. I cannot remain on this court forever ... ," as if the fate of civilization depended on his
beliefs alone. Id. at 922-23, 943 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The same
egocentrism, although not as transparent, may have caused this Justice to venture farther into
conjecture in Daubert than a more restrained jurist would have thought prudent.
207. Daubert,509 U.S. at 598-601.
208. Id. at 593-94. For example, the Court seems to have confused the work of Popper with
that of Hempel, whom the Court cited for related propositions, but whose philosophy is very
different. See id.; Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S66-68 (Supp. I, 2005). Thus, it confused "scientific" with "reliable" when it
created its falsifiability criterion. Id. Beyond that, the Court confuses "testable" with "has been
tested"; the former would apply even to an assertion that not only has not been tested, but that we do
not know yet how to test.
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philosophies of science, with Popper's being a relatively narrow one;2°9
the Supreme Court not only misunderstood Popper's philosophy, but
also chose it to the exclusion of theories that would fit better in some
contexts. 2 1 The Court purported, then, to identify four factors indicative
of reliability that the Court said were nonexclusive. 2 1 As the Court
should have recognized would happen, these have become the "Daubert
factors," often relied on as an exclusive list, despite the Court's
insistence that they were nonexclusive.2 12 The Court also created a
requirement of evidentiary "fit" or relevance but gave an example of
evidentiary fit or relevance that was unpersuasive. 21 3 Worse yet, in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court extended Daubert to
nonscientific witnesses.21 4 The Daubert criteria, it said, were to be
consulted for all expert opinions, nonscientific as well as scientific,
although only to the extent that they might be helpful,215 and with
"leeway" 2 6 -a direction to the lower courts to apply Daubert to all
scientific witnesses, followed by a direction not to do so.
All applications of scientific theory to concrete historical questions
require a degree of judgment, and that judgment is often the essence of
the question of reliability. Does experience about throat cancer provide
209. See Haack, supra note 208, at S67; see also CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 45-51 (1965) (allowing for

possibility of confirmation, and asserting that Popper's view "involves a very severe restriction of
the possible forms of scientific hypotheses"); KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 18, 22 (1972) (asserting that scientific confirmation, as opposed to
falsification, is impossible, and that failure to falsify "says nothing whatever about.., the
'reliability' of a theory") (emphasis omitted).
210. See Crump, Trouble with Daubert, supra note 204, at 32-39 (proposing other factors, with
reference to other philosophies of science).
211. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
212. See Crump, Trouble with Daubert, supra note 204, at 40.
213. The Court observed that while information about phases of the moon might "fit" the
question of the relative darkness of a certain night, it would not "fit" the question whether an
individual "was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night." Daubert, 509 U.S. at
591-92. But the later conjecture (which might be called the "werewolf inference") is excludable not
because it does not "fit," but because it thoroughly flunks the Court's separate concept of
"reliability." If the werewolf inference could be established as a "reliable" scientific
principle, then
ironically, it probably would "fit," because it predicts an outcome that precisely answers the
assumed issue-but this is like asking, "If planets were bigger than stars, how far away would they
be?," because the werewolf inference is not "reliable."
A better example might be given by stating that Boyle's Law (a "reliable" principle,
presumably, within limits) "fits" for approximating the relationship between pressures, volumes,
and temperature of ideal gases. It does not, however, "fit" the calculation of momentum of vehicles
involved in an automobile accident.
214. 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).
215. See Crump, Trouble with Daubert, supranote 204, at 10-14.
216. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149-52.
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evidence that can be helpful in answering a question about stomach
cancer? 21 1 Is evidence about a new type of DNA analysis, with higher
error rates than earlier types, sufficiently reliable to tell a jury something
of value about a question for which an imprecise answer is still helpful?
Daubertprovided no answer to the first question and supported multiple
conflicting answers, without any indication of proper resolution, for the
second. Under this sloppy influence, one trial court even decided that
fingerprint identifications were inadmissible, by conscientiously
applying the Daubert factors (although the court later retracted this
strange holding).218 The worst thing about the exclusionary opinion in
the fingerprint case was that the court's analysis faithfully followed
Daubert and applied it honestly to the situation before it. The flaw was
not in the court's decision, but in the Daubertdecision itself.
The four Daubert factors of falsifiability (or actual testing, which
2t 9
the court confused with falsifiability, although it is quite different),
peer review, error rate, and general acceptance-which produced that
strange result in the fingerprint identification case-are to be applied,
Kumho says, to all expert witnesses22 -- meaning, to financial witnesses,
economists, accident reconstructionists, and gang terminology experts.
Against all reason, the Supreme Court insisted that these criteria could
even apply to some degree to an expert perfume sniffer, one who is able
22 1
to identify any of hundreds of ingredients in a scent. The questions
"Has anyone tested the principles by which you claim to detect this
ingredient in this perfume mixture?" and "What are your error rates?"
seem poor indicators of proper admissibility in such a case, but the
Supreme Court left us in a position where those are the relevant
questions. The factors apply even more poorly to a gang terminology
expert:
Attorney: So, you claim that the phrase "sleeping with the fishes"
means "dead." Are there any principles that you used to
determine that this conclusion is "falsifiable"?
Witness: "Huh?"
Attorney: Have those principles, governing "sleeping with the fishes,"
been peer-reviewed or made the subject of publication?
217.

Cf Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143-47 (1997)

(considering evidence

presenting a similar kind of "fit" question).
218.

United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (depublished)

220.

Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149-50.

221.

Id.at 151.

(excluding identification), vacated by 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 571, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (reversing
exclusion).
219. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); see also supra note 208.
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Witness: I have no idea.
Attorney: What error rates attach to the principles that you allegedly
used?
Witness: Well, none.
Attorney: Are your principles generally accepted by other gang
terminology experts?
Witness: No, only by those who regularly watch The Sopranos.
A lower court ought to be able to apply an opinion of the Supreme Court
according to its terms, but if the Court's opinion in Kumho is read
according to its terms, this is the kind of nonsense that results.
One might object that the gang terminology expert does not purport
to use "principles"--that the expert is just testifying from experience,
almost as a percipient witness would, to the effect that he has often heard
the phrase, "sleeping with the fishes," always in a context where its
connotation was equivalent to "dead," and that he is not trying to say
that there are any underlying "principles." Precisely. But the Court and
rulemakers have made such a mess out of things in this area that
"principles," according to the law, must underlie the gang
terminologist's translations. The governing rule requires a threshold
showing, for every expert witness, that the witness has used reliable
"principles," has considered appropriate facts and data, and
has reliably
applied the "principles" to the facts and data. 2 In other words, the
perfume sniffer and the gang terminologist must identify reliable
"principles" that they have used, and they must show that
they have
applied these asserted "principles" reliably to certain "facts" that they
have isolated. This is a silly idea, of course; it cannot be done because
the perfume sniffer's honest answer has to be, "I didn't use principles; I
just sniffed it."' 223 And yet, principles are what amended Rules 702 and
703 require. The Rule drafters would have done better to leave the Rules
alone and recognize the limits of their understanding, emulating the
modesty of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
On the other hand, it is entirely possible for a trial judge to
recognize a purported expert opinion that is so misleading that it should
not be admitted. As the Fifth Circuit explained in a pre-Daubertcase,
United States v. Johnson, a trial judge would be on sound ground in
excluding the opinion of an identification expert to the effect that he
could discern the hair color of a subject from the subject's fingerprints.
The Johnson court, however, upheld the admittance of evidence that a

222.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

223. See Crump, Trouble with Daubert, supra note 204, at 15-16.
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certain substance was imported marijuana, offered by a government
expert named de Pianelli, who testified that he could determine this fact
from "the experience of being around a great deal [of marijuana] and

smoking it."'224 De Pianelli did not use "principles," but rather applied

his (apparently extensive) experience to the case facts. The court held
that the opinion of an expert should be excluded if it was "inherently
implausible," a label that could be applied, it said, to the hair-colorfrom-fingerprints opinion, but not to de Pianelli's opinion about
imported marijuana.225 I do not think that the trial judge in Kumho, who
excluded a tire-defect technologist's opinion about accident causation,
rendered a decision that improved on this "inherently implausible"
standard, nor did the Supreme Court with its follow-Daubert-but-notreally approach in its opinion in that case.
Daubert purported to liberalize the admissibility of expert opinion
evidence. It emphasized the tendency of the Federal Rules to admit
226
contested evidence, so as to allow the jury to decide in cases of doubt.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the Daubert decision, however, is that
Justice Blackmun's elaborate structure of purportedly nonexhaustive, but
actually exhaustive criteria, and his examples about fit that were not
examples about fit, have produced exactly the opposite result. Daubert
and Kumho have made the admissibility of expert evidence much more
difficult. Every case of significance, today, requires Daubert hearings.
These hearings are expensive; prior to Daubert, they rarely were
227 The criteria for expert witnesses
necessary at the pretrial stage.
involve multiple hoops to jump through. This difficulty is evidenced by
an article written by a scholarly judge, Harvey Brown, titled Eight Gates
for Expert Witnesses.228 The evidence must pass by St. Peter at the
229
Although this is certainly not
pearly entrance eight separate times.
Judge Brown's intention, it is the necessary implication in an adversary
system where lawyers properly use every available tool not only to
prove their own cases, but also to destroy their opponents'. By the end of
a Daubert hearing, in fact, it is not uncommon for even an intelligent
judge to have lost her way in the resulting maze. I recall one case
involving a financial expert-a forensic accountant-in which the judge
575 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
Id. at 1362.
226. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
227. See Crump, Trouble with Daubert, supra note 204, at 1.
228. Harvey Brown, Eight Gatesfor Expert Witnesses, 36 HOuS. L. REv. 743 (1999).
that
229. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
heaven").
of
gates
the
at
Peter
gatekeeper role should not be restrictive like "St.
224.
225.
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became concerned with the question whether the underlying principles
had been peer reviewed. The judge ultimately ruled that the opinion
should be excluded because the proponent's legal theory--not anything
about the financial opinion at issue, but the legal theory to which it
assertedly was relevant-had not been peer reviewed!
In comparison to this sort of practice, the simpler but more precise
test that the Fifth Circuit applied to de Pianelli's marijuana opinion in
United States v. Johnson, depending upon whether the opinion is
"inherently implausible," sounds more on target.230 Better yet, the test
might depend upon an application of Rule 403: Admit the evidence
unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its tendency to
mislead, confuse, or consume undue time. A judge who does not aspire
to become an amateur scientist cannot hope to do better in difficult
cases.
Beyond this, Daubert itself proposed some good solutions to the
problem of unreliable expert evidence, solutions that did not require
exclusion. The jury has the ability to reject evidence, including expert
opinions. Jurors in many cases are more suspicious of experts than
lawyers are. Also, cross-examination of an expert expressing an
unreliable opinion helps to expose it as such. The opponent can also
offer opposing experts to debunk the offending opinion. Furthermore, a
grant of a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law is also a way
for the judge to control the result. And finally, a Rule 403-based decision
to exclude the evidence can be made if it is so discernibly unreliable that
its probative value is outweighed by confusion, tendency to mislead, or
undue consumption of time. 23 1 This kind of judgment can be made at the
pretrial stage in an appropriate case, through a motion in limine or for
summary judgment. But the pretensions of judges to an understanding of
intricate questions about the philosophy of science, such as their
attempts to apply the abstruse and shifting concept of falsifiability that
Popper advocated (which the Supreme Court transmogrified), and the
efforts of judges to be smarter than experts at their own expertise, are so
dysfunctional that the Rules requiring these standards should be
abolished in favor of simpler substitutes.

230. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
231. Daubert,509 U.S. at 595-96.
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VI.

AUTHENTICATION: SHOULD THE DOCUMENT OR OBJECT
ITSELF SUFFICE?

Authentication requirements are another set of rules that sometimes
increase the cost of trial for dubious purposes. Recently (and quietly),
232
Arizona relaxed certain authentication requirements in divorce cases.
The decision was based upon a perception that litigants who appeared in
court carrying report cards or medical records were unlikely to do so
fraudulently.2 33 Many of these litigants act pro se, it appears, and even in
cases with counsel, the waste associated with the need to produce live
authenticating witnesses from schools and doctors' offices probably
outweighs the value of the authentication requirement. I would have
to
asserted that this kind of authenticating witness was not necessary
234 but
begin with and that the litigant herself could supply the predicate,
it is the nature of rules of evidence to be confusing, to produce
unpredictable exclusions of good evidence, and to invite judges to
235
impose requirements beyond those that the rules call for. A competent
attorney would naturally feel this concern and would bring in the outside
authenticator whenever possible. Arizona's decision, to recognize that
this cautious (and wasteful) approach usually is unnecessary, is a step in
the right direction.
The basic authentication rule is that real or documentary evidence is
admissible if supported by evidence "sufficient to support a finding" that
236 The requirement does little to protect
it is "what its proponent claims.
much of anything. It is among the lowest burdens of proof that the law
requires. If any reasonable juror could believe that the item is likely
237
authentic, the judge must admit it. Evidence to the effect that "it looks
for
like it" or "I just recognize it from its overall appearance" is enough
238
the
But
be.
should
it
rule,
the
to
admissibility--or, at least, according
232. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Arizona Makes Family Courts More User-Friendly,A.B.A.
time,
J., Jan. 2006, at 38. The change is conditional: "Either party can invoke the full rules at any
but unless parties object, the looser rules will apply." Id.
233. "Most of these things are unlikely to be tampered documents." Id. at 39.
234. Rule 90 1(a) says that authentication consists of "evidence sufficient to support a finding
a report card in
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." A parent who has received
standard.
minimal
this
meet
can
regular form at about the right time
235. Cf, e.g., supra notes 48-55 (discussing the decision in Frechettev. Welsh).
236. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
it is
237. "Once a prima facie case [of authenticity] is made, the evidence goes to the jury and
States
United
court."
the
not
evidence,
the
of
authenticity
the
the jury who will ultimately determine
F.2d 778,
v. Carriger, 592 F.2d 312, 316 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Goichman, 547
role.
jury's
the
of
nature
the
from
follows
784 (3d Cir. 1976)). This conclusion
that the
238. Cf United States v. Thomas, 38 M.J. 614, 622 (U.S.A.F.C.M.R. 1993) (holding
containing
bag
paper
a
of
consisting
exhibit,
the
of
appearance
general
witness's recognition of the
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low standard in the authentication rules does not keep these rules from
imposing costs that outweigh their value. Authentication requires a
witness: for each document source there exists one more individual
whose bodily presence the lawyer or litigant must produce.
Again, the law in this area is at variance with every other method of
careful decisionmaking. If a law school considers the application of a
prospective student, it does not require the student to physically present
an employee of the student's undergraduate college to vouch for the
authenticity of the student's transcript and withstand cross-examination
about it. Similarly, the admissions committee would accept a letter of
recommendation from a justice of the state supreme court because of its
regularity of appearance, without summoning the justice to appear
personally before it and swear that, yes, this is indeed the judge's
letterhead. It is not that fraud is impossible in such circumstances; there
have surely been cases of doctored transcripts or recommendation
letters. Instead, the decision not to insist on personal authentication
reflects a judgment that its marginal contribution to fraud prevention
would be insignificant while the costs would be unreasonably
cumbersome. This reasoning is similar to the thought process that led
Arizona to eliminate some court-imposed authentication requirements.239
Subject always to the judge's exclusionary authority under Rule 403, I
would advocate the repeal of the authentication requirement in this
context as well.
VII.

THE REMAINING RULES IN THE 400 SERIES: RELEVANCE AND
COUNTERWEIGHTS

The 400 series is one place where I would retain many of the rules
intact. The 400 series concerns relevance issues, or the probative value
of evidence balanced against counterweights that serve other policies.
The remaining rules in the 400 series, then, include Rules 401 through
403, which provide for a general balancing of relevance versus
counterweights,2 40 and Rules 408 through 412, which sacrifice relatively
small amounts of probative value to serve extrinsic policies, including
encouragement of settlement, protection of remedial measures,
safeguarding of generosity in paying medical expenses, the insurance

drug paraphernalia, was sufficient authentication; the court further held that failure to object did
not
render counsel ineffective because the authentication was sufficiently clear).
239. See supranotes 232-33.
240. See FED. R. EVID. 401-403.
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24
relationship, and the privacy interests of sexual assault victims. ' These

rules operate almost in the manner of privilege principles.242 They are
debatable in the same way that every rule is, but my arguments for
abolition would not apply to them. Accordingly, for purposes of this
Article, I shall treat Rules 408 through 412, as well as the core of most
privilege rules, as being retained in substantially their existing forms.
Rules 401 through 403 are the heart of the relevancecounterweights balance, and I would retain these in modified form. What
would the modifications be? First, the definition of relevant evidence is
too indiscriminate. As I have argued in another article, the definition of
relevant evidence in Rule 401, which includes information that has
"any" tendency to nudge the outcome either way, provides no
standard.2 43 Taken literally, it means that all information of any kind
whatsoever is "relevant" to any issue anyone can name,2 " although it is
not usually applied in this manner, of course.245 In some instances, the
"tendency" will be uncertain and infinitesimal, but even an uncertain and
infinitesimal influence qualifies as "any" influence. The result is that the
Rule defines relevance so that there is no such thing as irrelevant
evidence. This is why Rule 401 contains no standard. Rule 402 provides
that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, and thus, the drafters must have
intended for there to be such a thing as irrelevant evidence, but the
definition that they provided gives us no way to recognize it.
The drafters of these Rules considered two models of relevance
before deciding. The Wigmorean concept required at least some
minimum degree of probativity as a condition of relevance. 246 If the
inference depended upon indefinite, multiple chains of reasoning, and if
it was so slight that no reasonable juror could have used it in making a
decision, the evidence was not relevant, according to Wigrnore. The
drafters rejected this definition and instead opted for the Thayerian
241.

See FED. R. EVID. 408-412. Note that I have previously distinguished the repetitive-

behavior evidence rules on the ground that these rules improperly negate what I find to be a proper
inference that there is a human tendency to repeat. See supra Part IV.

242. The rules "relating to subsequent remedial measures and settlements" rest on "social
policy considerations akin to privileges, that is, to encourage certain conduct regardless of whether
the excluded evidence is 'good' evidence or not." ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, § 8.06, at 34546.
243. See Crump, IrrelevantEvidence, supra note 32, at 6-20.
244. See id. at 9-14 (arguing that "literally irrelevant" evidence is impossible under the Rule

401 formulation).
245.

See id. at 14-19 (arguing that judges exclude what they call "irrelevant" evidence without

focusing on the Rule).
246.

See IA JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 28, at 969

(Peter Tillers ed., 1983).
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model of relevance. Thayer defined relevant evidence by the "any
tendency" approach, with no minimum degree of probativity required. 4 7
The result is that Rules 401 and 402 are non-rules when taken at
face value, insofar as exclusion is concerned. Instead, Rule 403 carries
out the more meaningful business of exclusion. For many kinds of
evidence, this approach is satisfactory. Rule 403 tells the court to
balance the probativity of the evidence against counterweights that
include prejudice, confusion, misleading or cumulative evidence, and
undue consumption of time. 248 Rule 403 contains an unevenly weighted
scale, however; exclusion results only if the counterweights
"substantially outweigh" the probative value. 249 This part of the Rule
also functions properly because it instructs the courts to admit the
evidence and trust the jury if the probativity is significant and if the
question of its relative value compared to prejudice or other
counterweights is close. Rule 403 is an appropriately designed
instrument to exclude truly bad evidence while preserving a policy of
liberal admissibility of useful information.
But there is one important instance in which Rule 403 does not, by
its terms, perform its function, and it is here that the non-standard of
Rules 401 and 402 matters. Specifically, Rule 403 does not exclude
evidence of mere tangential relevance, if the counterweights are also
slight. If, for example, the evidence is so remote that its influence on the
issues is low, then it has low probative value, but for the same reason, it
probably also has low prejudice and other counterweights. We cannot
use Rule 403, as written, to exclude evidence that has little connection to
the issues, because although its probativity is low, the counterweights
are similarly insignificant, and it is the counterweights that induce
exclusion according to Rule 403.250
There is one further factor that is important here, and that is the
strategic importance that the use of low-relevance evidence may have to
lawyers.251 Particularly if a lawyer has a bad case, the skillful use of lowrelevance evidence can enable the lawyer to distract the jury from the
issues, to exhaust witnesses so that cross-examination will make them
247.

JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON

LAW 530 (1898); see also FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note (explaining the adoption of
the logical relevance standard).
248.

FED. R. EVID. 403.

249. Id.
250. See Crump, Irrelevant Evidence, supra note 32, at 19-20 (explaining this result with
examples).
251. See id. at 20-26 (arguing that, contrary to the obvious conclusion, lawyers feel powerful
motivations toward offering irrelevant evidence).
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appear less credible than they are, and to pursue other strategies that are
at variance with the cause of justice.2 52 Although it is no longer recent
enough to make its details leap immediately to mind, the criminal trial of
O.J. Simpson is an example. The defense cross-examined some
253 No
witnesses over periods that lasted more than nine days each.
witness can undergo this kind of adversary process without exhaustion
and without making unintended statements that derogate unfairly from
credibility, and no jury can retain the issues over the resulting length of
trial. The use of low-relevance evidence, gnawed at as a dog gnaws at a
bone, is a tactic for carrying out this strategy.
My solution, then, would be to modify Rule 401 to insert a
Wigmorean threshold as a condition of relevance. I would advocate a
low standard, to preserve the policy of liberal admissibility, but not so
low as to enable attorneys to produce a year-long trial that should have
been a fraction of that duration, as the Simpson lawyers did. To the "any
tendency" language, then, I would add a qualifier: the tendency must be
"sufficiently significant, when combined with other evidence, to have
the potential to affect the decision of a reasonable juror." If any
reasonable juror could combine the evidence at issue with other evidence
to make a difference, the evidence is admissible, but not otherwise. This
is a change from the current regime, which sets no minimum standard
for relevant evidence. In other words, I believe Wigmore was right,
Thayer was wrong, and the Advisory Committee was wrong in
following Thayer. At the same time, the proposal of a low standard
means that the judge must defer to the jury, and indeed to the most
credulous possible juror who can be labeled "reasonable." This proposal
is not likely to exclude meaningful evidence. What it will do, however,
is provide the court with a better basis than currently exists for
eliminating delay and distraction from the trial.
At the same time, I would amplify, as opposed to modify, Rule 403.
The Rule should explicitly state that the reference to a tendency to
confuse, to mislead, to produce cumulative evidence, and to cause undue
delay, empowers the court to exclude any kind of evidence so unreliable
that its probative value is substantially exceeded by these
counterweights. This power should explicitly extend to unreliable
hearsay, expert opinion, character evidence, and object authentication, as
well as to all other evidentiary issues. The abolition of categorical rules

252. See id. at 26-46 (explaining these uses of irrelevant evidence).
253. See id. at 32-38, 39 & n. 185 (analyzing the "witness control or debilitation function," and
describing lengthy cross-examinations).
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against these kinds of evidence, then, would not mean that thoroughly
unreliable evidence would be indiscriminately admissible. The
difference would be that the mechanism of exclusion would depend
upon a decision by the court that a piece of hearsay evidence is so bad
that its relevance is substantially outweighed by counterweights, rather
than upon a blanket rule such as the rule against hearsay. Rule 403
should be clarified, then, to explicitly authorize the exclusion of
particularly bad hearsay, as well as unreliable expert opinion, overly
prejudicial character evidence, and highly dubious authentication.
VIII.

GENERAL CONCERNS: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, OPPONENTS'
POWERS, AND THE SCARCITY OF JURY TRIALS

A.

"Don'tTry ": The Elimination of Jury Trials as a

Result of Our Rules
Why, then, should we remove so many of the Rules of Evidence?
The decline of the jury trial has become well publicized-and to some,
is alarming. Professor Gross and Dean Syverud have documented the
phenomenon in their article titled, Don't Try: Civil Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement.254 Their message is that although we revere the
jury trial, we do not act upon that attitude. Instead, our policies silently
tell litigants, "Don't try your lawsuit," because we create heavy
incentives to prevent them from doing so. Since Gross and Syverud's
study, the phenomenon has progressed to the point that, in 2001, only
1.5% of civil cases in federal courts were resolved by jury trial. 5 This
tiny figure represents a nearly two-thirds reduction from 4.3% in
1970.256

What is most alarming about these figures is the question that they
do not answer: "What has happened to the cases that once were resolved
by jury trial, but now are not?" It seems clear that a larger proportion of
cases than ever before are resolved by judges in matter-of-law rulings:
by summary judgments, dismissals, or sanctions, for example.257 Do we
really want judges wedging more cases into judge-controlled matter-oflaw dispositions, rather than decisions that take the facts into account? If
254.
255.
256.
257.

Gross & Syverud, supra note 37.
See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial,A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 27.
See id.
It seems likely, for example, that adjudications for missing time deadlines may have

increased. Cf DAVID CRUMP ET AL. CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 2, at 483-85 (containing

notes about this method of disposition).
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not, we should take a hard look at our Rules of Evidence, which are one
mechanism that drives the length and expense of trials, and therefore
increases judges' need to be disposition-minded. At the same time, some
of the disputes that would have resulted in trials during the 1970s
probably are settled instead. The mechanism by which this result occurs
is more mysterious than that for dispositions by judges. But a fair
inference, and a disturbing one, is that some of the increase in
settlements may be judge-driven too. It seems probable that judges,
whose dockets have forced them to become more disposition-minded
today than ever before, have taken to inferring which party has
prevented a negotiated resolution and to promulgating strategic pretrial
rulings designed to induce that party to act reasonably-by settling.
Most of the rules of evidence are aimed at protecting valid policy
goals. Resistance to abolishing the rules would sensibly focus upon
those effects, and support for abolition must deal with that argument.
The issue that most often is overlooked, however, is the phenomenon of
the vanishing trial. Rules of evidence make the process unpredictable,
and certainly make it longer and more expensive. The proposal for
abolition proceeds not only from a judgment that the rules cost more in
lost accuracy than they provide in putative benefits, but also from the
strong possibility that they are a significant cause of the reduction of
trials and the increase in their cost.
B. Strategic Behavior by the Judge: Does It Include Imposing
Disadvantagesupon RecalcitrantParties?
The issue of expense is rarely explored in evidence courses. Some
58 which is
hearsay exceptions, for example, require unavailability,
defined in such a way as to drive up costs grossly disproportionately to
any conceivable gains.259 Students, or for that matter rule drafters, rarely
perceive these effects from study of the text of the rules themselves. Of
even greater concern is the possibility that the judge's rulings (or refusal
to make them) can balloon these costs. Judicial rulings can even confront
recalcitrant parties with evidentiary costs as a means of precipitating
settlement. This possibility is even further removed from the
imaginations of evidence students, and possibly from those of
policymakers as well.

258.

See FED. R. EVID. 804.

259. See, e.g., supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (discussing why deposition evidence
should be admissible regardless of unavailability).
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In an effort to get the point across in my evidence course, I use a
series of images. Following coverage of the hearsay exceptions that
require unavailability, I invite students to consider what their effect
might be. My first image excerpts the definition of that term,
"unavailability., 260 I then offer a not-so-hypothetical situation. A lawyer
representing a witness informs the judge that the witness plans to rely on
the privilege against self-incrimination and to refuse to testify. Is the
witness "unavailable"? Imagine that we have former testimony from this
witness, which is usable only if the witness is "unavailable" by reason of
privilege; 261 is the witness unavailable because of the witness's lawyer's
representation to the court? "Yes," say the students without hesitationerroneously. "No," is my immediate response. What else does the rule
say must happen? Usually, even as they stare at the rule, most students
miss the point. I project the image of an unfriendly looking judge. At
length someone recognizes that in addition to other requirements, the
judge must rule on the claim of privilege before unavailability results.262
That is difficult for the judge to do without context, at the pretrial stage,
and without the witness present.
My next image is that of a stack of $20 bills. Money. "What does
this slide have to do with it?" More blank looks from my students.
"Well, okay; here's the next image." I project a subtraction on the
screen: "$20,000 - $30,000 = -$10,000," and I explain that in our
hypothetical case, the amount in controversy, which represents a loss
due to forgery, is $20,000, but bringing the witness to trial will cost an
estimated $30,000, because the witness is incarcerated in Idaho. The
light begins to dawn. It may be that the only way to use the witness's
hearsay, even though it is former testimony that was fully crossexamined by the opponent, is to bring the witness to the courtroom: a
step that will produce a $10,000 loss even if we win the verdict and
recover 100% of our damages! Viewing the unavailability requirement
this way highlights the argument that the rule is of doubtful wisdom.
"No problem!," most students still happily maintain. In law school,
the judge is the hero. The judge of law student imagination always
makes enlightened rulings. So: "Won't the judge recognize the problem
and provide a pretrial ruling?" Not necessarily, is the answer; just getting
the court coordinator on the telephone and attempting to persuade him or
her to give you a hearing may be impractical for a question of this kind,

260. FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
261. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
262. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
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in some quarters. Besides, the judge may deliberately decide not to issue
any ruling before trial. Why? I return to the image of the unfriendly
judge. And then, the next image is a dialogue. You ask the judge, "Your
Honor, will you give me a pretrial ruling recognizing the witness's
privilege?" The judge responds, "No." The students now face a decision:
bring the witness, guaranteeing a $10,000 loss, or run the risk that key
evidence will not be admissible. Some students remain convinced that
this cannot be the effect of any rule anywhere. But it is precisely the
effect of this rule, in this situation.
Why would a judge rule this way? Decisionmaking capacity is a
limited resource. Judges develop a facility for concentrating their rulings
on issues that advance their cases toward resolution. They simply must
exercise this facility, or they will be unable to do justice at all. Sensible
judges attempt to ration decisions about discovery, for example, and they
try not to consume unnecessary time with pretrial rulings about
evidence. If that is not enough to explain the refusal, some judges are
meticulous. They want everything assembled before they make rulings.
This kind of judge may want the witness brought in as a means of being
sure she is doing it right. In insisting on this wasteful procedure, the
meticulous judge is not responsible for doing the math that leads to a
$10,000 loss. And finally, it may be that the judge has already decided
that the proponent of this evidence should settle this case. The judge
thinks that, rather than being greedy, the proponent should accept $5000
instead of full damages of $20,000. Therefore, without articulating this
rationale, the judge refuses to rule-as a subterranean strategy for
forcing the plaintiff to deal. The complexity of the rule, and its insistence
on unnecessary multiple criteria as a condition for allowing former
testimony, create the mechanism.
C. Strategic Behavior by Litigants: The Proponent'sGeneral
Preferencefor Live Testimony and the Opponent's Power of
Compulsory Process
Strategic behavior by litigants is another factor that counteracts the
risks that underlie some exclusionary rules. What would evidence
proponents do if they knew they could use hearsay statements instead of
live witnesses? What would their opponents then do? Consideration of
these questions illuminates some of the issues surrounding rule
abolition, especially in the area of hearsay. Analysis will show that
strategic behavior by litigants will result in the reduction of some of the
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risks that underlie the hearsay rule.263 In other words, inferences about
strategic behavior by litigants will generally support the argument for
abolition of the hearsay principle.
First, it should be obvious that a party entitled to rely upon hearsay
will not necessarily omit to call live witnesses. Reading hearsay to the
jury is boring and not very impressive. Almost always, the proponent of
the evidence foregoes some of the impact of the evidence by doing this,
as well as some of its credibility.2 64 Therefore, even if hearsay were
freely allowable, we should expect litigants to present live testimony
from witnesses with crucial information that requires full absorption by
the jury, as well as witnesses whose credibility is crucial, unless there is
an overriding strategic reason to the contrary. 265
The assumption must be, however, that sometimes the proponent
will choose for forensic reasons to forego live testimony in favor of
purely hearsay presentation, if allowed to do so. The proponent will have
decided that strategic concerns make the use of hearsay, in this case,
more persuasive than a present witness. In this situation, however, the
opponent is not without remedy. If the opponent wants the witness, the
opponent has the same power of compulsory process that the proponent
does.2 66 If, for example, the proponent presents hearsay that is a dubious
representation of the witness's testimony, the opponent can call the
witness live, to put the evidence in context or even to contradict it. If the
witness is not credible-if the witness cannot present a coherent story in
response to questions-the opponent likewise can bring the witness in
by the power of compulsory process to demonstrate this lack of
credibility. In fact, the Supreme Court has relied upon this right to
compulsory process as an important corrective to the risks inherent in
admitting hearsay. In other words, the Court's decisions are premised, in
part, on the conclusion that hearsay evidence is more readily acceptable,
and carries fewer disadvantages, in light of the opponent's ability to
present the witness live if the proponent does not.267
In fact, one can argue that the real abuses that led to the hearsay
rule, such as the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, did not reflect misuse of
hearsay nearly so much as denial of compulsory process. When the
Crown used the affidavit of his alleged coconspirator Lord Cobham
263. See supra Part III.B (discussing hearsay risks).
264. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
265. "Many declarants will be subpoenaed by the prosecution or defense, regardless of any
Confrontation Clause requirement ....
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 (1992).
266. See id.
267. Id.
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instead of Cobham's live testimony, Raleigh's objection was based not
so much on the offensiveness of the affidavit as upon the refusal of the
court to allow Cobham to be produced at Raleigh's request. Thus,
Raleigh pleaded with the court, "But it is strange to see how you press
me still with my Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him ....
,,26
Cobham, he pointed out, was present "in the house hard by, and may
soon be brought hither; let him be produced, and if he yet will accuse me
or avow this confession of his, it shall convict me and ease you of
further proof., 269 The court refused Raleigh's request for compulsory
process on multiple grounds: Cobham's confession was firm, the
circumstances supported it, and a retraction might result in falsehood,
which would be prejudicial to the King. The court explained, in a
passage that sounds strange to modem ears, "[F]or, having first
confessed against himself voluntarily, and so charged another person, if
we shall now hear [Cobham] again in person, he may, for favour or fear,
retract what270formerly he hath said, and the jury may, by that means, be
'
inveigled.

The most serious error of the court in Raleigh's case, then,
concerned the absence of compulsory process. The message is simple.
When the declarant is available, the real issue concerns, not the risks of
hearsay, but rather, the risks of suppressing the ability of the opponent to
call the witness. That, and not the hearsay problem itself, was the issue
of deepest concern in the case of Sir Walter Raleigh.
The dueling strategies of opposing lawyers in this situation can be
summarized as follows. The proponent will likely prefer to call the
witness live in many, if not most, instances even if the prospect of using
hearsay is available. 27' The exceptions to this preference will fall into at
least three categories. First, presenting the live witness may be expensive
in comparison to the value of the case. Second, the witness's testimony
may concern an issue that is tangential, that is unlikely to be contested,
or that is merely cumulative. Or, third, presenting the live witness may
produce unwelcome or even contradictory testimony, or it may destroy
the witness's own credibility. In the first two instances, it seems likely
that the opponent will decide not to use compulsory process to produce
the witness. But if preventing the live witness is impractical because of
considerations of cost, tangential importance, or lack of genuine
controversy, it is hard to see what is lost by incurring the asserted
268.

See WALTZ & PARK, supra note 82, at 97.

269. See id.
270.
271.

Id.
See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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hearsay risks. In the third case, in which the live witness will contradict
the evidence or appear noncredible, the power of the opponent to
produce the witness by compulsory process would come into play. If
cost considerations are not prohibitive, the issue is significant, and the
opponent could meaningfully reduce the impact of the evidence by
having the live witness present, the opponent would then be expected to
call the witness. Thus, the rational strategies of the parties, by
themselves, will mitigate the hearsay risks when they are significant,
even without a rule against hearsay.
There are remaining problems, however. One of the most
significant is the possibility of spoliation. The proponent of the evidence
may be motivated to secure the absence of a noncredible or
inconsistently helpful witness in favor of using hearsay from the witness
instead. This is a valid concern, but it already exists with respect to all
litigation. In fact, is it not entirely possible that, in Leake v. Hagert, the
it? 272
father encouraged the unavailability of the son, or even arranged
This kind of spoliation, in fact, is probably one of the unseen costs of the
hearsay rule: the possibility that, with the rules as they are, a party can
prevent the opponent's use of good evidence, such as that in Leake v.
Hagert, by arranging unavailability. The hearsay rule, in other words,
itself encourages a mirror-image kind of spoliation. In any event,
spoliation is a self-limiting strategy, because spoliation authorizes an
inference against the spoiler.2 73 We probably do not catch every
instance, but the party who uses it risks the loss of everything, and this
possibility provides an important countervailing motivation. In addition,
there are the other protections we have analyzed earlier in this Article,
which already exist or could be put into place: the jury has an innate
sense of suspicion about hearsay; we can enhance that suspicion if we
desire, by an instruction; we can require a knowledgeable witness who
can discuss the hearsay risks to be presented live for cross-examination;
and we can even, if we want to be particularly careful about hearsaybased results, reinstate the common law rule providing that hearsay is
insufficient to support a verdict.274

272.
273.

See supranotes 91-96 and accompanying text (summarizing this case).
"[S]poliation evidence.., is admissible to show consciousness of guilt." United States v.

Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.4, at 162-63 (3d ed. 2003).
274. See supra Part 11I.C.
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ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLES: PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY BY SETTING REASONABLE LENGTHS FOR TRIALS

So far we have considered existing rules. Changing existing rules,
however, would allow us to have new and different principles. If we
limited the adverse impact of the rules, for example, we could do more
to ensure that trials were not so scarce and expensive. Professors Arthur
R. Miller and Geoffrey Hazard once participated in a report that
suggested that a rule could be adopted so as to limit the longest trials to
no more than ten days. 275 These two gentlemen are heavyweights, but
the proposal radically departs from our traditions in the United States.
On the other hand, it has been reported that in Great Britain, the
birthplace of our right to jury trial, a criminal case can ordinarily be
concluded in a day and a half.276 Have the British adopted rules that
shortchange accuracy for expeditiousness? It seems doubtful; England is
a sophisticated democracy, one that values individual rights, although
not precisely according to American standards. If Britain can do that, it
ought to be possible, in America, to try a jury trial for almost any case in
less than ten days-if, that is, we revise our Rules of Evidence to
eliminate the waste that they now produce. In fact, there are indications
that American lawyers might support serious restrictions on trial lengths.
At a symposium sponsored by the ABA Litigation Section's Vanishing
Trials Project, "some participants suggested an ABA resolution
recommending time limits on trials," and there was "a remarkable
consensus with regard to the need to create efficiencies in the trial
,,277
process ....
In other words, one of the pleasant results of abolishing the Rules
of Evidence would be that we could take seriously the limit on jury trial
length that Professors Miller and Hazard participated in proposing.
Then, we could expect people who now cannot serve on lengthy cases to
be available for jury service. We could try big cases in a period that
would let the jury focus on the issues. We could adjust the lengths of
smaller cases accordingly, with the hope that a small case-by which,

275. See Crump, Irrelevant Evidence, supra note 32, at 50-51 (citing SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL
FOUND. & SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, CONFERENCE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT 2 (1995) (Arthur R. Miller, discussion leader, and Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., reporter)).
276. See BBC, Crime Fighters: Crown Court, http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/fighters/
crowncourt.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
277. See Stephanie Francis Ward, "Vanishing Trials" Issue Won't Go Away, A.B.A. J. EREP., Dec. 19, 2003.
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regrettably, I mean one with less than $100,000 in controversy--could
be tried at a cost that would not exceed what is at stake.
A rule to effectuate this policy might be difficult to draft, but here is
an effort. Rule 611 now provides:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for ascertainment of the truth,
(2) avoid needless consumption of time,
278 and (3) protect witnesses from
embarrassment.
undue
or
harassment
An additional sentence at the end of Rule 611 could provide:
For a very complex case, the court shall exercise this control by the
imposition of time limits on witnesses or overall presentation by each
party so that the expected or anticipated overall length of evidence
presentations does not exceed ten [or twenty-one, or thirty] days, and
for cases of lesser complexity, the court shall exercise this control to
produce trials of reasonably proportional lengths.
I have no pride of authorship in the specific length of ten days. I
took this figure from the proposal by Professors Miller and Hazard,
although they too seem to be flexible about the exact time limitation that
should be set. The limit could be twenty-one days, or one month, and it
still would produce the desired result, albeit to a lesser degree. The rule
could also build in greater flexibility for cases in which it is needed:
At the conclusion of the time planned for any given witness or for
overall presentation, the court shall grant an appropriate extension
upon a showing that the ascertainment of truth will thereby materially
be enhanced.
Also:
In deciding upon any request for extension, the court shall take into
account, among other relevant factors, the time consumed by
objections or argument interposed by the opponent.
And if that is not enough, the rule can add:
In an unusual case, upon a finding that the ascertainment of truth may
be impaired in a complex trial by a time limit of ten [or twenty-one, or
thirty] days, the court may excuse the parties from a time limit of ten
[or twenty-one, or thirty] days and set a longer time that it considers
necessary.

278.

FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
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Courts have on occasion imposed time limits.27 9 The only real
innovation in the proposals offered here is the requirement that it be
done generally and that a specific target length be considered.
X.

CONCLUSION

Why is it necessary to consider these issues? Because, in a nation
that purports to revere jury trial, a result in which only 1.5% of civil
cases are resolved by juries 28° is an embarrassment. Because rule drafters
have so often and so thoroughly ignored this issue. Because the resulting
trials are wasteful. Because a judge who allows a straightforward murder
case to occupy a full year in trial is not following the requirements of
Rule 611 as presently written, with its injunction against undue
consumption of time, and because a judge who allows a witness to be
cross-examined for nine days (or for that matter, even for a considerably
shorter period) has forgotten the requirement that harassment of
witnesses should be prevented. 28' Because trials are too long for most
people with responsibilities to serve as jurors, because they cost too
much for most people with modest disputes to be able to try their cases
economically, and because a jury cannot be expected to focus on the
case reasonably after a trial has dragged on for month after month.2 82
The reform of the vanishing trial will not be possible, however,
with our current rules of evidence. The rules make it difficult for counsel
to convey background material effectively. They make some kinds of
issues impossible to prove within a reasonable expense.283 In fact, the
cumulative time that evidentiary objections and arguments consume is
itself so lengthy in an average trial that even if the rules did not have the
effect that they now have upon the availability of information to the jury,
the length of trial would still be greatly expanded by the processes for
rule enforcement.28 4

279. Cf Blumenthal v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 515-17 (Ct. App. 2006) The court
held that a mistrial based on a two-day limit for a marriage dissolution trial was an abuse of
discretion, and discussing the propriety of time limits, including a five-hour limit for a "short cause"
in California. The court added, however, that it was unaware of any local rule of court either placing
maximum time limits on any trial or empowering the judge to impose such a limit. Id. at 517-18.
280. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 91-95 (discussing proof issues in Leake v. Hagert).
284. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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The current rules are arbitrary. The hearsay principles are a clear
example,2 85 although the same criticism applies to rules excluding
repetitive behavior evidence, expert opinions, and objects depending on
authentication. The hearsay exceptions, as well as the definition of
hearsay, are full of irrationalities. For example, imagine a hearsay
statement that meets all of the requirements for a dying declaration (or
"statement under belief in impending death"). If the victim dies, and the
charge is murder, the Federal Rules admit the hearsay pursuant to this
exception.286 If the victim merely lapses into a vegetative state, however,
so that the charge is aggravated assault or attempted murder, the
technical aspects of the exception are not satisfied, and the evidence
must be excluded. 87 There is no difference in the rationales for
admissibility, and this result is nonsense.
Each of these exclusionary rules purports to prevent some
disadvantage associated with perceived unreliability. The rules do so
inconsistently, however; more importantly, they are unnecessary to
achieve their purposes. Again, the hearsay rule is an example. Arbitrary
rules exclude good evidence, as the dying declaration example above
shows. Furthermore, the purposes of the rule in protecting against the
hearsay risks of perceptivity, qualification, sincerity, expression, and
bias would be better served by other means. First, there is no reason to
assume that jurors will be any less capable of evaluating these risks than
they will be in the case of live witnesses. In fact, it seems more probable
that jurors are properly skeptical of hearsay generally. 288 Second, if we
are concerned about that issue, we can require a jury instruction
pinpointing the risks and telling jurors to evaluate the evidence
accordingly. Third, if that is not enough, we can require the proponent to
produce a witness who can be cross-examined so as to expose the
precise hearsay risks. Fourth, we can provide that hearsay is insufficient
to support a verdict and thereby require a substantial component of livewitness evidence. 289 Fifth, we can rely on the strategic interests of the
adversary attorneys: The proponent will not generally rely upon hearsay
alone for important points but will produce live witnesses for forensic

285. Cf supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (arguing that the excited utterance
exception admits evidence precisely because it fits criteria that make it less reliable).
286. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
287. The evidence is admissible only in a civil case or a criminal homicide case. Id.
288. See supra Part III.C.
289. See supra Part III.E.
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reasons, and if290the proponent does not, and if it is strategic to do so, the
opponent can.
A blanket rule of this kind is anomalous, furthermore, because no
one would make a major decision in any other field without substantially
relying on hearsay. No one would make a major purchase or sale,
employ a key employee, or admit or become a law student by refusing to
rely upon written statements made by absent third parties. To the extent
that the Constitution requires exclusion of certain kinds of evidence,
particularly through the Confrontation Clause, its restraints must be
strictly observed. But even in criminal cases, a blanket exclusion that
affects even reliable, non-testimonial hearsay is unjustified. The dying
declaration exception above is illustrative of how irrational, and how full
of arbitrary requirements, our rules have become.
The same can be said of other exclusionary rules. In the area of
expert opinion, for example, the Supreme Court and the rule drafters
have made a pluperfect mess. 291 The character evidence rules that

eliminate propensity evidence and references to repetitive conduct,
actually exclude good evidence that jurors are perfectly as capable as
lawyers to evaluate. Worse yet, by purporting to distinguish proof of
action in conformity from inferences of intent or identity and by
admitting the latter, the rules are internally inconsistent and produce
arbitrary results.292 Even requirements of authentication are so costly
despite their adoption of one of the lowest standards known to the law
(and therefore, their failure to provide much protection against unreliable
evidence), that at least one jurisdiction has partially eliminated them.293
Rules 401 through 403 are a sound basis for eliminating evidence
whose probativity is greatly exceeded by counterweights. The
modifications suggested here would also eliminate relatively
inconsequential inferences, and they would expressly require the court to
exclude evidence so unreliable that it should not be admitted.294 This
kind of calculus is a more reliable guide to the achievement of the
purposes of the rules than the current regime, with its impenetrable
thicket of hearsay rules and exceptions, our internally inconsistent and
irrational principles governing repeated behavior, and the shifting
complex of confusing criteria that the Court has mandated for expert
opinion. A standard that depends upon an excess of unreliability over
290. See supra Part
291. See supra Part
292. See supra Part
293. See supra Part
294. See supra Part

VIII.C.
V.
IV.
VI.
VII.
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probative value would be simpler and more precise than our existing
rules. It would function less frequently to exclude good evidence on
bases unrelated to its merits. It could be applied expeditiously. It would
result in more trials of more manageable lengths, or, more to the point, it
would enable us to adopt rules requiring the advocates to get to the
point.29 5
As Americans, we frequently want everything both ways. We want
government that provides extensive social services, but at a reduced cost
in taxes. We want terrorism eliminated, but we respond to politicians'
fulminations against the National Security Agency's practical means of
detection of terrorist communications. Similarly, we also want to
eliminate all possible risks of unreliability from trial evidence, while
hoping that juries can decide cases accurately and expeditiously with
whatever happens to be left. And we expect that we can preserve the
right to jury trial while adopting procedures so cumbersome that they
reduce the proportion of jury trials to unacceptable levels. It is time for
us to stop pretending about these last two issues. We cannot ignore the
disadvantages created by cumbersome procedures, including our rules of
evidence, and at the same time hope that we can achieve consistent
results while reversing the trend toward the vanishing trial.

295.

See supra Part IX.
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